roger wasson company - cheapersunglasses.com

Now then: if truth and, more basically, mind have the same
value as matter and life considered independently, they therefore
have no value. But we have already shown that the assertion---truth
has no assignable value---is self-contradictory. It is
concluded that the whole objection---that mind has no assignable
value as over against matter and life---is self-contradictory
and hence invalid.
While I think the objection already stands refuted, one final
set of remarks might be made from a more positive point of
view. The implication of the preceding analysis is that rational,
moral nature is the only conceivable end of the cosmic process,
since any other assumption about such an
end involves either material or logical contradiction. After all,
if God is Himself rational and moral, it is prima facie reasonable
that He would create a universe in which rational and
therefore moral being was the chief end.
I therefore conclude that the whole objection is invalid and
that the teleological argument is anthropocentric only in being
rational and for the very reason that the chief end of the universe
is rational.
Because any given entity has no single function and hence
not a single purpose.---The teleological argument assumes that
“everything has its ‘purpose’ in the total scheme of nature,
whether animate or inanimate.” (Footnote 58: Randall and
Buchler, op. cit., p. 162.) But as a matter of fact, many, if not
all, entities have no single purpose or function. “No object has
an absolute or single ‘purpose’ under all circumstances. If a
random stone is to be spoken of as having a purpose or function,
this is not something with which the stone is intrinsically
endowed or antecedently equipped; it is determined only after
the stone is found to function within its environment in a definite
way.” (Footnote 59: Ibid., p. 163.) It follows that “the assumption
of a single purpose on which this teleological