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intosh, The Problem of Religious Knowledge, p.
147f.)
(i) The position stated.---Logical idealism holds that, while
the objectivity of value is undeniable, the supreme end may yet
subsist eternally without being fully embodied in any particular
mind: the realm of value is transsubjective and subsists eternally
as a universal ideal or group of ideals. Thus the position
may be characterized as: Logical, since it asserts that value
transcends, in its eternal validity, any psychological dependence
on particular finite selves which envisage the supreme end; Idealism,
since it nevertheless denies that the supreme end is fully
embodied in an existent being. Since therefore the supreme end
is not thus embodied, the inference to God from the objectivity
of value is unjustified.
(ii) The position refuted.---It seems to me that this view has
already been refuted in my summary statement of the moral argument
itself, for we there argued that it is of the very nature of
a supreme end that it be thus fully embodied in an existent eternal
mind. But to consider the theory on its own merits:
(a) The assertion that the good is transsubjective but not embodied
in an existent being is ultimately self-contradictory. For
what is meant by saying that the supreme end is objectively
valid independently of its recognition by any particular finite
mind?
Either this realm of values exists or not. If it does not exist,
what is the significance of asserting its objective validity? The
attribution of such a predicate means that the datum in question
possesses an ob- [[240]] jective reality which is determinative
of propositions about it. If it does exist, what is the meaning of
abstracting from it the predicate of being? I should think anyone
would admit that whatever exists has being. Thus in either
case, it turns out that objectively valid and eternal value has objective
and eternal being: and this means that the proposition--the
good is objective and eternal but not existentially embodied-