roger wasson company - cheapersunglasses.com

By way of objection to this solution: after so much energy
has been expended to establish the existence of God, it will
scarcely be necessary to do anything more than point out that
naturalism is totally inadequate as a solution to this or any other
ultimate problem. We have already attempted to show that the
existence of an absolutely necessary being of intelligent nature
is the only rational explanation of the space-time universe, since
every supposition to the contrary leads to the self-contradiction
of skepticism. Hence it may be put down as established that the
naturalistic solution is eliminated at once: the solution to the
problem of evil must be sought in terms of a viewpoint that
transcends any posited self-sufficiency of nature.
But the proposed solution of naturalism is also ethically, as
well as metaphysically, self-contradictory. Naturalism, in this
context, discards the existence of God on the ground that theistic
explanation is incompatible with the presence of evil in the
world. But in a naturalistic universe, there is no evil in any ultimately
significant sense, as we have indicated above; for evil
exists only as over against an ultimate standard of goodness
which has no validity for the naturalist. It follows that the naturalist
has denied God’s existence on grounds which are valid
only in terms of the position he is trying [[338]] to subvert. If
evils are real, then they cannot be used as a basis for denying
the existence of an ultimate standard of good, or what is ultimately
the same thing, God: for evils exist only on the supposition
that such an absolute good exists. On the other hand, if
evils do not exist, they certainly cannot form the basis for a denial
of God’s existence. If, to avoid this predicament, the naturalist
begins by denying that there are any evils, then he must
take one of two grounds: he must hold either that statements
about good and evil are cognitively meaningless (logical positivism),
or that such statements are true or false only for their
proponents (relativism). But both of these positions have already
been refuted in Section A., Chapter IV, of the present