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What then, is an unconscious purpose? It is an unpurposed
purpose---which is nonsense. Or what is an impersonal intelligence?
Since self-consciousness is involved in the direction of
action toward a previsioned end, an impersonal intelligence is
an unintelligent intelligence---which, again, is nonsense.
Therefore the expressions, “unconscious purpose” and “impersonal
intelligence,” are self-contradictory and meaningless.
The preceding considerations have already shown that the
production of unforeseen effects in human experience is no
support for the hypothesis of unconscious purpose. But the
same point can be reached in another manner. (Footnote 74:
Ibid., p. 108f.) The unforeseen effects of human action are
sometimes advantageous and sometimes not: hence they require
redirection through intelligent action which does prevision its
end without intelligent manipulation, if there is to be progressive
realiza- [[325]] tion of ends at all. But this would imply,
not that the teleological principle was unconscious, but if anything
superconscious.
For “nature’s ‘unconscious wisdom,’ in other words, must
vastly exceed the sapience and foresight of humanity, liable as
that is to errors which, save for reasoned amendment, might
prove fatal.” (Footnote 75: Idem.) That nature does go straight
to her mark would imply, in other words, not the absence of
previsioning intelligence, but the complete and exhaustive presence
of it, unless we beg the question by referring to instances
of the case in dispute---such as animal instinct, etc. It turns out
therefore that the assertion---nature is not the result of previsioning
intelligence---is self-contradictory.
Finally, it may be asserted that either no teleological explanation
is necessary at all, or else it is necessary by reference to
intelligent will. If unconscious purpose may be all that is required
as a teleological explanation, then such purposes can be
attributed separately to all the individual instances of adaptation
that present themselves in nature. The eye, for example, may