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cept the rational and moral character of His own being, He would then stand under an external limitation and be certainly finite. To put the answer in slightly different terms, we may pose the [[256]] question: does not the present objection undermine any theistic view of the world whatever? From the standpoint of metaphysics, the objection, as already suggested, moves to the assertion of an infinite series of finite causes for the world, or else to no extraneous cause at all. But if an infinite series of any kind is accepted, there is no reason for transcending the series of finite causes and effects which constitute the present world order: and the idea of such a self-sufficient world is precisely the naturalistic metaphysic. It need hardly be said that if we assert no extraneous cause for the world, a naturalistic view is posited at once. From the standpoint of epistemology (and here VanTil is especially in view: since his argument seems to assert that God's finitude is involved in the notion that He can be known through a necessary relation to finite being) the result is ultimately the same. VanTil seems to me to be ambiguous here. Does he mean this necessary relation to finite being as a dependence of the idea of the absolute being on the idea of relative being? Or does he mean that the Absolute Being is thus known as necessarily related to a finite knower who uses the argument? In the first case two observations are in order: first, why should the fact that God is concluded from the existence of relative being mean that God is finite? Would it not mean the very opposite? For a relative and contingent being requires the existence of an absolute and necessary being for its adequate explanation, as I have already attempted to show. Again, that God's being known from the existence of finite being would involve God's finitude can be the case only on the assumption that no passage whatever is possible from factors in experience to the existence of an absolutely infinite being: but if this is the case, either God
is unknowable or He does not exist. The first alternative is selfcontradictory; the second is naturalism. But suppose VanTil intends the second possible meaning suggested: that the absolute being is finite because He is shown to be necessarily related to a finite knower who argues through to His existence. This objection would then apply against any view that maintains the knowability of God. For suppose God's existence to be revealed in some other way than through facts of experience available to all rational minds---through special revelation, for example, the possibility and actuality of which I do not in the least deny. God's reality will either be known through this revelation or not. If it is known, it is still known relatively to a finite knower: and this is [[257]] true regardless of the mode of revelation, so that either God's existence as absolute is unknowable or else the fact that He is always known by a finite knower does not deprive Him of infinity and necessity in the least. On the other hand, if God's reality is not known through such a proposed revelation, the argument ceases at once. In any case the objection is either directly invalid and unsustained, or it is indirectly thus by asserting the selfcontradictory proposition that God is unknowable. Therefore, whichever meaning is put on VanTil's words, his objection reduces to the assertion that God is unknowable, which is in turn either self-contradictory or equivalent to the bare assertion that God does not exist. Again we land in the territory of a naturalistic world view. I consequently conclude that the entire objection, both metaphysically and epistemologically, undermines any theistic view of the world whatever. And thus the third ground for asserting finitude in God goes up in the smoke that springs from the fire of rational analysis. Either no argument to God is possible at all or else the fact that God is necessarily related to finite being does not impose any limit whatever upon His infinite and necessary existence. The
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The Resurrection of Theism
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Copyright ? 2003 Roger Wasson Compa
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Affectionately Dedicated To Three o
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Thus no matter what conclusion one
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Origin of the Present Work: the Nee
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By way of anticipation I should lik
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conviction tempered with a deep Chr
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CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY PRESS Sorely,
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Balfour, A. J. The Foundations of B
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Maritain, Jacques. The Degrees of K
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tions and reactions of the nature i
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If a person is to apprehend rationa
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GENERAL TABLE OF CONTENTS Introduct
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ANALYTICAL TABLE OF CONTENTS Part I
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Concerning Epistemology Proper ....
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Brunner............................
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Part III NATURAL THEOLOGY AND THE E
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General Nature of the Argument.....
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Conclusion on the Teleological Argu
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CHAPTER III.THE REDUCTIVE ARGUMENT
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to the sphere of logical validity .
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as a whole, or of the particular in
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F. Conclusion on the Objections to
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CHAPTER I THE MEANING OF RATIONAL E
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what have you---but a representativ
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wrong in failing to cede to the rat
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contradiction results directly, whe
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(c) Infinite: in which a single pro
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to that which is its condition.”
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concerning things as noumena, all p
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ally a separate type, or reduces to
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therefore the category of causation
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of thought underlying a categorical
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The application of the categories b
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In a single paragraph Kant dismisse
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determining the number of categorie
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Hence, there is, strictly speaking,
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In other words, our first intelligi
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the fact that knowledge could not b
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from the proposition itself, else t
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Every attempt to derive the categor
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But if necessary logical laws do no
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certainly not an arbitrary definiti
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(4) Intuitionism, finally, asserts
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upon the proper occasion of observa
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knowledge is apparently to be conce
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(iii) An idea which the soul acquir
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there is not only no objection to t
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tion. 21 Linguistic symbols themsel
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For ought we know, the synthetic fo
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unempirical dogma of empiricists, a
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The argument of Lewis.---That there
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ody of fixed meanings that are not
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Conclusion.---In the light of the a
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order not, in every case, bare itse
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It is concluded that synthetic apri
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the case, since such an assertion i
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ity, in its mobility and process, t
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ecome disinterested, self-conscious
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tion which denies intellect the cap
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assuming that just the categories m
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which the mind functions before the
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(5) Neither idea nor object exists.
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Thus, whether solipsism identifies
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ample, is not in the object as such
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propositions could be either tested
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ception will become increasingly ev
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There are three ways in which the c
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As Blanshard puts the point: “Wha
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thorough refutation that no more th
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if the two propositions were analyt
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that, Ultimate Reality being what i
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hand, theism---the doctrine that na
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Chapter I THE EMPIRICAL APPROACH Ob
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Working “from the outside in,”
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forming these principles is in the
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It is true that the intellect abstr
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God is eternal, or infinite---for s
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tional empiricism that has already
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But can it really be said that the
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lation of the kind suggested. In an
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which can be clearly specified. But
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affirmed that God was to be known o
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making for the realization of absol
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Brunner---while God is clearly mani
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‘Thou’ in Jesus Christ.”(Foot
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God is a mediated immediacy. while
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Section B. Chapter I; and the reade
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[indent] The tests of intuitions, h
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ather than that, as something rathe
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whether a special revelation would
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emember having met Him in personal
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Part, lies in evaluating alternativ
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But now: either scientific beliefs
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Insofar as this general view rests-
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grounds which are rational. Otherwi
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lect might perform functions of no
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assuming the existence of the god w
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Nor will it be difficult to see tha
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God is [[158]] known in terms of a
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first principle is to misunderstand
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conclusions as such do not depend f
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Because man is thus in sinful rebel
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In general, while strictly speaking
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find these categories to be the ver
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affirmation of God's reality; or el
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cally basic---that such espousal [[
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ecognize it at all---in which case
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(3) Does this distortion involve re
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liefs which characterize men are tr
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Yet both men attempt to meet just t
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ecause it suggests that, granting t
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takes to show that the mere concept
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must result from the application of
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It is important to note carefully t
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consistency of an idea is made, in
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plies actual existence, can I pass
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possible and then inferred its exis
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essarily existing. Now “if what w
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It may therefore be urged that we h
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It may be helpful to state the same
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le, then we could not say that the
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upon the conspiration of an indefin
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part of the universe is to say that
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matter, for the case rests, as we h
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In the third place, the basic movem
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ever occur to the man who sold me t
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itself requires explanation in term
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status within which he tragically c
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so oriented matter and its arrangem
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of two perfectly homogeneous masses
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sential function in connection with
Page 268 and 269: naturalistic terms without the supp
Page 270 and 271: (3) The Intelligibility of the Worl
Page 272 and 273: But aside from the general insuffic
Page 274 and 275: Nouy says: “This amounts to the r
Page 276 and 277: have run its course in establishing
Page 278 and 279: language mechanisms may be at work
Page 280 and 281: tions and hence on an absolute par
Page 282 and 283: these two fields would rapidly brin
Page 284 and 285: produce, by similar interaction, th
Page 286 and 287: this manner? The effect of a physic
Page 288 and 289: (2) But in the second place, the ve
Page 290 and 291: highest good, it is thus supreme in
Page 292 and 293: eternal or timelessly necessary, fo
Page 294 and 295: mately involves its own denial. How
Page 296 and 297: (b) Relativism or Subjectivism: val
Page 298 and 299: (c) Third, the relativist implies t
Page 300 and 301: --is self-contradictory; for it amo
Page 302 and 303: ditions of objective existence in t
Page 304 and 305: An Answer to Objections Against the
Page 306 and 307: with the express purpose, usually,
Page 308 and 309: ence can be asserted, for this last
Page 310 and 311: Conclusion It is therefore conclude
Page 312 and 313: note 2: G. H. Clark, A Christian Ph
Page 314 and 315: The Reciprocal Character of Any Arg
Page 316 and 317: Third Ground of Finitude in God: Th
Page 320 and 321: first alternative is not here in po
Page 322 and 323: multiplied beyond necessity; third,
Page 324 and 325: Conclusion The expansive-limiting a
Page 326 and 327: that is, that the world both has an
Page 328 and 329: tecedently existing void time. Henc
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Page 332 and 333: ing my existence, that of the pen,
Page 334 and 335: clude that either nothing exists, o
Page 336 and 337: Thus the sage of Koenigsburg paid t
Page 338 and 339: has already been established. To de
Page 340 and 341: Kant's minor objection to the teleo
Page 342 and 343: ception of a most real being to the
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Page 346 and 347: Preliminary Considerations In contr
Page 348 and 349: pure mathematics," is unjustified a
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Page 354 and 355: ment in this form does involve a tr
Page 356 and 357: eginning has already been analyzed
Page 358 and 359: B. Metaphysical Objections: which a
Page 360 and 361: sequence must depend on a nontempor
Page 362 and 363: It must be then that the scientific
Page 364 and 365: the world and decline to push throu
Page 366 and 367: in the absolutely self-conditioned
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the occurrence of processes must be
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again reach either the self-contrad
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tified? Even if there is an absolut
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the temporal and in the contemporan
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C. Conclusion: on the objections ag
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able. The question then becomes: fr
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probability, on the hypothesis of c
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the mere fact that x causes y, I ca
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motion of material elements is thus
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that I already know by direct exper
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watch made, once it is given in exp
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discerned in beings possessed of ra
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Now then: if truth and, more basica
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ational and moral being. I have the
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fragment may be but a temporary and
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the case that any chance universe i
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maintaining its operation. The sugg
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In the light of the above considera
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What then, is an unconscious purpos
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sistent with this attribute, since
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Such an end would either exist with
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have shown elsewhere, transcends th
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true, not because of the greater nu
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Because intelligence in God must di
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contradiction, and that consequentl
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ecause it affects the organic realm
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By way of objection to this solutio
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of conscious, intelligent will is t
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that God is good in any absolute se
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situation. God therefore is benevol
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Ghose, The Life Divine, Book II, Ch
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answers yes, for he trusts the pers
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and thus cling to the reality of th
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But consider this last possibility:
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only after a careful scrutiny of th
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to make the 'good' happy and the 'b
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of God's being. Thus each principle
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complete teleological explanation,
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(a) Orders of sentient being below
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(a) Much natural evil can be elimin
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sary condition for the existence of
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(b) The accumulation of cases thus
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. Reaction of divine law to the evi
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(1) The proportionate application o
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Since the whole range of objections
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the collocations of atoms in his ma
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Blanshard, Brand. The Nature of Tho
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_______. The Philosophy of St. Thom
Page 464 and 465:
Maritain, Jacques. The Degrees of K
Page 466 and 467:
Smith, Norman Kemp. A Commentary to
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Kant's argument concerning, 272f. A
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C criticism of cosmological argumen
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as an alternate to purpose, 307, 30
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Electionism: absolute, as an implic
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status of, 154f.; 158, 159; 166f. F
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its all-inclusive capacity for know
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Liberalism: a representative of its
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Nihilism: as a theoretical epistemo
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criticism of cosmological argument,
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Subjective empiricism: as an approa
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W Ward, J.: teleological argument,
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