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Such an end would either exist within God, in which case
there would be no need of its realization, or it would exist outside God as a possibility
yet to be realized; but then God would not be an omnipotent
and absolutely necessary being, for He would be limited by the
existence of an end not yet realized. It therefore follows that
either an omnipotent God can do nothing or else every possibility
of His [[328]] being has been realized from eternity. If omnipotence
cannot employ means and achieve ends, then these
two alternatives are the only logical possibilities.
But suppose that an omnipotent God can do nothing: this
position is liable to a double objection. First, it contradicts the
whole structure of argumentation which asserts that an absolutely
necessary being is the only rational explanation of the existing
universe: it is just the fact that God has done something
that led us to conclude His existence as an absolute being. Second,
the assertion is directly self-contradictory: for a God that
can do nothing is utterly devoid of omnipotence, so that the assertion
says that an omnipotent God is absolutely impotent--which
is absurd.
Now consider the other alternative involved in the ultimate
form of the present objection: suppose that all that an omnipotent
God can do must have been done from eternity. This position
is also objectionable. It contradicts the empirical fact that
successive processes are going on in the experienced universe:
if this is false, at least the illusion of these changes is in process,
and the problem is the same. Again, the position would mean
that the material universe is eternal: but then there must have
been an infinite series of successive changes in the universe,
and we have already demonstrated ad nauseam the impossibility
of an infinite series of actual existents. Thus the supposition
that all God’s acts must have been executed from eternity is either
experientially or logically self-contradictory, or both.