From Responsibility to Response: Assessing National - Brookings
From Responsibility to Response: Assessing National - Brookings
From Responsibility to Response: Assessing National - Brookings
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CHAPTER 1 <strong>Assessing</strong> <strong>National</strong> Approaches <strong>to</strong> Internal Displacement: Findings from 15 Countries<br />
Recovery and Development Plan for Northern Uganda<br />
(PRDP), which included as a strategic objective the<br />
facilitation of the voluntary return and resettlement of<br />
IDPs from camps, became operational in July 2008. 21<br />
While the PRDP aims <strong>to</strong> address the root cause of marginalization<br />
in the North and therefore is important<br />
in providing durable solutions for IDPs, in reality, as<br />
of August 2009 few IDPs had benefited from the “resettlement<br />
packages” referred <strong>to</strong> in the <strong>National</strong> Policy<br />
for Internally Displaced Persons. 22 However, the PRDP<br />
was expected <strong>to</strong> run until at least mid-2012, with a <strong>to</strong>tal<br />
budget of around $600 million. 23<br />
The vast majority of IDPs—1.1 million of the more than<br />
1.8 million displaced in the north—were displaced in<br />
Acholiland between 2002 and 2005, at the height of the<br />
conflict. 24 By July 2009, roughly 80 percent of the 1.8<br />
million IDPs had returned <strong>to</strong> their homes or <strong>to</strong> transit<br />
sites near their places of origin; even so, a significant<br />
number of people remained displaced in camps. 25 As of<br />
<strong>Brookings</strong>-LSE Project on Internal Displacement, June<br />
2011 (www.brookings.edu/events/2011/01_protracted_<br />
displacement.aspx). See also UNHCR, “Ending<br />
Displacement: Report on Workshop on the Framework<br />
for Durable Solutions, Kitgum, 17–18 June 2008” August<br />
2008 (www.internal-displacement.org); Government of<br />
Uganda, Office of the Prime Minister, “Camp Phase Out<br />
Guidelines for all Districts with IDP Camps,” May 2008<br />
(www.internal-displacement.org).<br />
21 Government of Uganda, Peace, Recovery, and Development<br />
Plan for Northern Uganda (PRDP), 2007–2010, p. 63<br />
(www.prdp.org.ug).<br />
22 IDMC, Uganda: Returns Outpace Recovery Planning: A<br />
Profile of the Internal Displacement Situation, 19 August<br />
2009 (www.internal-displacement.org).<br />
23 Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs<br />
(OCHA), Uganda Humanitarian Profile 2011, p. 18. IDMC,<br />
Overview: Uganda: Difficulties Continue for Returnees and<br />
Remaining IDPs as Development Phase Begins, p. 6, 28<br />
December 2010 (www.internal-displacement.org).<br />
24 Government of Uganda, “Department of Disaster<br />
Preparedness and Refugees, Office of the Prime Minister,”<br />
(www.opm.go.ug/departments.php?center_id=5).<br />
25 Follow-Up Working Visit of the Representative of the UN<br />
Secretary-General on the Human Rights of Internally<br />
Displaced Persons <strong>to</strong> Uganda, 13–17 July 2009:<br />
Memorandum on Key Findings and Recommendations<br />
134<br />
June 2010, only some 190,000, or 17 percent of the 1.1<br />
million displaced in Acholiland, remained displaced.<br />
According <strong>to</strong> RSG Kälin in his report on his follow-up<br />
visit <strong>to</strong> Uganda in July 2009, returns were possible in<br />
large part due <strong>to</strong> the<br />
res<strong>to</strong>ration of freedom of movement for all<br />
IDPs and the significantly improved security<br />
situation in the war-affected Acholi subregion.<br />
The shift of responsibility <strong>to</strong> uphold the law and<br />
order from the Uganda People’s Defence Force<br />
(the Ugandan army) <strong>to</strong> civilian authorities and<br />
the redeployment of civilian police <strong>to</strong> Northern<br />
Uganda was an important contributing fac<strong>to</strong>r. 26<br />
While officially the government supported all three durable<br />
solutions, some IDPs indicated that their decision<br />
<strong>to</strong> return was not fully voluntary in light of the fact that<br />
the government’s plans for camp closure pressured them<br />
<strong>to</strong> return. 27 Research commissioned by the <strong>Brookings</strong>-<br />
LSE Project on Internal Displacement examining local<br />
integration in Northern Uganda found that “[s]ome<br />
Government officials have exhibited bias <strong>to</strong>wards return<br />
as a preferred durable solution (subtly through messages,<br />
or overtly by issuing deadlines <strong>to</strong> leave camps).<br />
However, agencies and other officials have made efforts<br />
<strong>to</strong> clarify or counter such messaging, emphasising that<br />
return is voluntary.” 28<br />
The conditions in return areas, in particular insufficient<br />
basic services, land issues and inadequate economic opportunities—in<br />
addition <strong>to</strong> insecurity in some areas and<br />
the presence of unexploded ordnance—continue <strong>to</strong> preclude<br />
sustainable returns. 29 On a positive note, however,<br />
(www.brookings.edu/projects/idp/rsg_info.aspx#Kalin).<br />
26 Ibid.<br />
27 Oxfam “<strong>From</strong> Emergency <strong>to</strong> Recovery: Rescuing<br />
Northern Uganda’s Transition,” Briefing Paper 118 (www.<br />
oxfam.org); UNHCR, “Ending Displacement: Report<br />
on Workshop on the Framework for Durable Solutions,<br />
Kitgum, 17–18 June 2008.”<br />
28 Michelle Berg, “A Sort of Homecoming: Local Integration<br />
in Northern Uganda,” p. 127.<br />
29 See further, Michelle Berg, “A Sort of Homecoming: Local