From Responsibility to Response: Assessing National - Brookings

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CHAPTER 1 Assessing National Approaches to Internal Displacement: Findings from 15 Countries as squatters and non-farmers, who are unable to return for various reasons. Moreover, the methods employed by the government to move IDPs out of the camps—including use of force, lack of information, disconnection of the water supply, the end of general food distribution and promises of compensation once IDPs were back on their farms—induced involuntary return and were inconsistent with human rights standards. 36 The civil war in Sri Lanka displaced hundreds of thousands of people over the course of nearly thirty years. The Kumaratunga administration (1994–2005) expressed its commitment to establishing conditions for the return of IDPs through its Relief, Rehabilitation and Reconciliation Framework, which resulted—following the signing of a permanent cease-fire agreement with the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) in February 2002—in the National Framework for Relief, Rehabilitation, and Reconciliation (2002) and the Joint Strategy to Meet the Immediate Needs of Returned Internally Displaced Persons (2002–03). The Ministry of Resettlement and Disaster Relief Services (renamed as the Ministry of Resettlement in 2010), which managed camps and the provision of essential services, reported that it undertook several reconstruction projects to facilitate the return of IDPs to their places of origin. 37 36 UNHCR, Lessons Learned from UNHCR’s Emergency Operations for IDPs in Kenya, September 2008 (www. unhcr.org/publ/RESEARCH/48e5d90d2.pdf); Kenya Human Rights Commission, Tale of Force, Lies and Threats: Operation Rudi Nyumbani in Perspective (Nairobi: 2008). See also KHRC Briefing Paper, “Operation Rudi Nyumbani Wapi (Return Where?): Formulating Durable Solutions to the IDP Situation in Kenya,” June 2008; “Corruption in Operation Rudi Nyumbani,” The Standard, September 1, 2008. 37 Ministry of Resettlement and Disaster Services, “Provision for Infrastructure Development” [no date] (www. resettlementmin.gov.lk/projects-funds-resettlement. html). 136 Following the end of war with the LTTE in May 2009, the government of Sri Lanka gave priority to the return of the estimated 280,000 individuals internally displaced between April 2008 and May 2009. 38 However, obstacles to sustainable return have included inadequate de-mining of return areas—including agricultural areas, which are critical for rebuilding livelihoods—as well as damaged or destroyed homes and public infrastructure. As a result, many IDPs were displaced to host families or to temporary transit camps for protracted periods of time, and those in poorly de-mined return areas remained out of reach of international assistance. In addition, there were over 220,000 “old” IDPs, displaced prior to April 2008, primarily because of conflict. 39 A common theme evident from analysis of government response in Nepal, Uganda, Kenya and Sri Lanka is the priority given to IDP return and the limited support available for other durable solutions. In three of these four countries—Nepal, Uganda and Kenya—political settlements or agreements for the cessation of hostilities brought an end to the conflicts that had caused massive internal displacement, thereby opening up the possibility of return. Yet IDP returns have been slow, particularly because of inadequate conditions in areas of origin. The return of “new” IDPs in Sri Lanka constituted one of the three largest IDP return movements among all countries affected by conflict-induced internal displacement in 2010. 40 38 See further the Sri Lanka case study in chapter 2 of this volume. 39 As of December 2010. Internal Displacement Monitoring Center, Sri Lanka: IDPs and Returnees Remain in Need of Protection and Assistance, 14 January 2011, p. 20 (www. internal-displacement.org). 40 The largest return movements in 2010 were in Pakistan, Sri Lanka and the Philippines. IDMC, Internal Displacement: Global Overview of Trends and Developments in 2010, March 2011 p. 85 (www.internal-displacement.org). IDMC, Sri Lanka; IDPs and returnees remain in need of protection and assistance, 14 January 2011 (www.internaldisplacement.org).
Benchmark 10 Establish the Conditions and Provide the Means for IDPs to Secure Durable Solutions Countries in which the conflict or violence Is ongoing In Afghanistan, 41 the government’s approach to durable solutions has been to promote return; it has done little to advocate other durable solutions, such as local integration. In 2008, under a joint plan with the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the government encouraged IDPs living in the three largest IDP camps to return to their home provinces. The plan received a poor response from IDPs, many of whom were unwilling to return due to insecurity, ethnic tensions and lack of economic opportunities in their places of origin. 42 In 2009, of a total of 135,000 IDPs living in “camp-like settlements,” only 7,000 returned. 43 According to the Afghan Independent Human Rights Commission, “growing insecurity, homelessness, disputes over property, and lack of livelihood options are the factors obstructing the return of refugees and the reintegration of returnees and IDPs.” 44 The lack of attention given to land disputes is especially notable because such disputes have been not only a consequence but also a core cause of conflict and displacement. In 2007, the Representative of the UN Secretary-General on the Human Rights of Internally Displaced Persons stressed that land disputes and landlessness “remain a substantial cause of displacement and a substantial obstacle to return.” 45 Moreover, impunity has not been checked: the Law on National Stability and Reconciliation, passed by Parliament in 2007, has been criticized as effectively barring Afghan authorities from 41 See further the Afghanistan case study in chapter 2 of this volume. 42 IRIN, “IDPs Reluctant to Return Home,” 28 April 2008 (ww.irinnews.org/Report.aspx?ReportId=77957). 43 IDMC, Internal Displacement: Global Overview of Trends and Developments in 2009, May 2010, p. 76 (www.internaldisplacement.org). 44 Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission (AIHRC), Report on the Situation of Economic and Social Rights in Afghanistan: IV, Qaws 1388 (November/ December 2009), December 2009 (www.aihrc.org.af). 45 OHCHR, “UN Expert Concerned about Growing Problem of Internal Displacement in Afghanistan,” 20 August 2007 (www.brookings.edu/projects/idp/RSG- Press-Releases/20070820_afghanistan.aspx). 137 prosecuting alleged perpetrators of displacement in the absence of a complaint by a victim. 46 With the conditions necessary for sustainable return lacking in many areas in Afghanistan, the reality is that many IDPs who chose to return were displaced once again. However, those who were displaced anew due to lack of basic services (as opposed to insecurity) have tended to be classified by the Afghan government as “economic migrants”; as a result, their ongoing humanitarian needs have been “easily dismissed by provincial authorities and largely ignored by relief agencies.” 47 Similarly, the majority of refugee returnees and deported asylum seekers, most of whom have returned from Iran and Pakistan, have been displaced once again, largely because they were landless prior to displacement or because they found their land occupied on returning, often by members of another majority tribal or ethnic group. 48 Given the continuing conflict in the Central African Republic, efforts to find durable solutions for IDPs there also have been difficult. In June 2008, the government and all armed insurgent groups signed the Libreville Comprehensive Peace Agreement, which required the government to pass a general amnesty law and to undertake the demobilization, disarmament and reintegration 46 See Human Rights Watch, Afghanistan: Repeal Amnesty Law, 10 March 2010 (www.hrw.org); Amin Tarzi, “Afghanistan: Amnesty Bill Places Karzai in a Dilemma,” Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, 23 February 2007 (www.rferl.org/content/article/1074897.html). 47 IRIN, “Afghanistan: Insecurity, Lack of Aid Prompt IDPs to Leave Camp,” 21 June 2009 (www.irinnews.org/Report. aspx?ReportId=84926). 48 AIHRC, Economic and Social Rights in Afghanistan II, Kabul: Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission, 1 August 2007 (www.unhcr.org/cgi-bin/texis/ vtx/refworld/rwmain?docid=471f4a5b0); Alec McEwen and Sharna Nolan, “Water Management, Livestock and the Opium Economy: Options for Land Registration,” Working Paper Series (Kabul: Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit), February 2007 (www.areu.org.af/ Uploads/EditionPdfs/701E-Options%20for%20Land%20 Registration-WP-print.pdf).
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The Brookings Institution - London
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From Responsibility to Response: As
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CONTENTS Acronyms .................
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ACRONYMS AIHRC Afghanistan Independ
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FOREWORD It is with great pleasure
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ACKNOWLEDGMENTS Given the large num
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It is a central tenet of internatio
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legislation relevant to IDPs. Still
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amend existing ones, in line with t
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Background and Aims of the Study In
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displacement persists for several y
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operationalizing the responsibiliti
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Therefore, it is not surprising tha
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Azerbaijani, Chinese, French, Portu
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National Initiatives In Iraq, IOM p
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of the country. 62 In addition, six
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in French and Spanish depending on
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serves only to supplant and absolve
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CHAPTER 1 Assessing National Approa
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Benchmark 1 Benchmark 1 Prevent Dis
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Benchmark 1 Prevent Displacement an
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Benchmark 2 Raise National Awarenes
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Conclusion Benchmark 2 Raise Nation
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Benchmark 3 Data Collection on Inte
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—Current location and location of
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its registration rolls intra-urban
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and profiling of three types of IDP
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the government of Afghanistan under
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Benchmark 4 Training on the Rights
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actions of DRC authorities and nong
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the provision of technical support
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Justice, National Cohesion and Cons
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February 2010; one outcome of the t
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Benchmark 5 Ensure a Legal Framewor
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Conclusion Benchmark 5 Ensure a Leg
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Benchmark 6 Develop a National Poli
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Georgia From Solidarity to Solution
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Kenya National Response to Internal
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Afghanistan Internal Displacement i
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Sri Lanka Gaps in the Government Re
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Domestic Financing Foreign financin
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This study seeks to shed light on h
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CHAPTER 3 Translating National Resp
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For each country case study, the ex
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5 6 Ensure a Legal Framework for Up
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9 9 a) Facilitate IDPs’ Participa
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12 Cooperate with International Com
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