From Responsibility to Response: Assessing National - Brookings
From Responsibility to Response: Assessing National - Brookings
From Responsibility to Response: Assessing National - Brookings
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CHAPTER 1 <strong>Assessing</strong> <strong>National</strong> Approaches <strong>to</strong> Internal Displacement: Findings from 15 Countries<br />
secure a durable solution <strong>to</strong> their displacement, but it<br />
has taken some steps <strong>to</strong> stabilize conflict areas and work<br />
<strong>to</strong>ward the return of the displaced.<br />
Most IDPs in the DRC have been displaced multiple<br />
times, and aid workers have difficulty providing assistance<br />
in many instances because of insecurity and logistical<br />
constraints. In his 2008 mission report, RSG Walter<br />
Kälin called attention <strong>to</strong> the fact that houses had been<br />
destroyed; that infrastructure, including schools, was<br />
lacking in the areas of return; and that female-headed<br />
households were especially vulnerable. Many of the<br />
women he met during his mission, particularly returning<br />
IDPs, said they were vulnerable <strong>to</strong> acts of violence,<br />
including rape, in return areas. 84 Returns have provoked<br />
land disputes among various ethnic groups and between<br />
returnees and those occupying their land, who in many<br />
instances have also been displaced. 85 However, in spite<br />
of the difficulties and the fact that returnees often experience<br />
renewed displacement, large numbers of IDPs<br />
have returned <strong>to</strong> their communities. For example, in<br />
2009, 1 million returnees were reported, half of them<br />
in North Kivu. That constituted the highest number of<br />
returns in Africa for that year and the second-highest<br />
number in the world, after returns in Pakistan. 86<br />
Notably, in June 2009 the prime minister of the<br />
Democratic Republic of the Congo launched the<br />
Stabilization and Reconstruction Plan for War-Affected<br />
Areas (STAREC), funded and supported by the United<br />
Nations, for the stabilization and rebuilding of former<br />
84 UN Human Rights Council, Report submitted by the<br />
Representative of the Secretary-General on the Human<br />
Rights of Internally Displaced Persons, Walter Kälin—<br />
Addendum—Mission <strong>to</strong> the Democratic Republic of the<br />
Congo, A/HRC/8/6/Add.3, 16 May 2008, para. 60 (http://<br />
ap.ohchr.org/documents/dpage_e.aspx?m=71).<br />
85 International Crisis Group, Congo: Four Priorities for<br />
Sustainable Peace in Ituri, Crisis Group Africa Report No.<br />
140, 13 May 2008 pp. 9–10 (www.crisisgroup.org).<br />
86 IDMC, Internal Displacement: Global Overview of Trends<br />
and Developments in 2009, p. 17; IDMC, Democratic<br />
Republic of the Congo: Over 2.1Million IDPs in the Context<br />
of Deteriorating Humanitarian Conditions, February 2010,<br />
p. 4 (www.internal-displacement.org).<br />
144<br />
conflict zones in the east of the country, including<br />
through the return, reintegration and recovery of IDPs<br />
and refugees. 87 The priorities outlined in STAREC fall<br />
in<strong>to</strong> three main categories: security and res<strong>to</strong>ration of<br />
state authority; humanitarian and social assistance; and<br />
economic recovery. 88<br />
However, according <strong>to</strong> the prime minister in 2009,<br />
STAREC had been stymied “due <strong>to</strong> a number of constraints,<br />
such as the armed confrontations between<br />
the <strong>National</strong> Congress for the Defence of the People<br />
(CNDP) and the Armed Forces of the Democratic<br />
Republic of Congo (FARDC).” 89 Indeed, a range of triggers<br />
of conflict and violence—such as social and economic<br />
marginalization, inter-ethnic tensions and land<br />
and property disputes—have also impeded progress on<br />
IDP and refugee returns. Funding has also been identified<br />
as a major limitation <strong>to</strong> STAREC’s ability <strong>to</strong> provide<br />
durable solutions for IDPs. 90<br />
The Truth and Reconciliation Commission of the<br />
DRC, created in 2002 by the Comprehensive Peace<br />
Agreement, was constitutionalized in the Transitional<br />
Constitution (2003) as a means <strong>to</strong> achieve national<br />
unity, including through the provision of compensation<br />
<strong>to</strong> victims. However, the commission’s work has been<br />
limited; reportedly it is unable <strong>to</strong> conduct investigations<br />
87 GoDRC, Programme de Stabilisation et de Reconstruction<br />
des Zones Sortant des Conflits Armés: STAREC, June<br />
2009; UNDP, “Trust Fund Factsheet: DRC Stabilization<br />
and Recovery” (http://mdtf.undp.org/factsheet/fund/<br />
CRF00); Stabilization and Recovery Funding Facility for<br />
the Democratic Republic of Congo: Terms of Reference, final<br />
version, 5 November 2009 (http://monusco.unmissions.<br />
org/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=E8IWO6fJjIY%3D&tabid=<br />
4516&mid=4889).<br />
88 See UN Peacebuilding Fund, “Priority Plan for the<br />
Democratic Republic of Congo,” (http://monusco.<br />
unmissions.org/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=YWXss5SIqH8<br />
=&tabid=4521&mid=4888.<br />
89 MONUC, “UN Supports Revised Stabilization and<br />
Reconstruction Plan for Eastern DRC,” 24 February 2009<br />
(http://reliefweb.int/node/298860).<br />
90 UN Peacebuilding Fund, “Priority Plan for the Democratic<br />
Republic of Congo.”