From Responsibility to Response: Assessing National - Brookings
From Responsibility to Response: Assessing National - Brookings
From Responsibility to Response: Assessing National - Brookings
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CHAPTER 1 <strong>Assessing</strong> <strong>National</strong> Approaches <strong>to</strong> Internal Displacement: Findings from 15 Countries<br />
Return of IDPs and refugees always has been a heavily<br />
politicized issue and a major stumbling block in the<br />
peace process for both conflicts. While the Georgian<br />
government has consistently promoted the right <strong>to</strong><br />
return and considers return a key element in its reestablishment<br />
of terri<strong>to</strong>rial control over the two secessionist<br />
areas, for the same reasons the de fac<strong>to</strong> authorities of<br />
Abkhazia and South Ossetia largely resist return, albeit<br />
with some exceptions. Lasting political solutions <strong>to</strong><br />
these conflicts and the possibility of large-scale return<br />
of the displaced have remained elusive.<br />
At the same time, the government’s emphasis on return<br />
has had the effect of undermining IDPs’ rights in their<br />
place of displacement. Until 2007, IDPs were legally<br />
barred from owning land or voting in the locality where<br />
they were living while displaced unless they forfeited<br />
their IDP status and its associated benefits. In addition,<br />
IDPs were led <strong>to</strong> believe that by exercising such rights<br />
in their place of displacement, they risked forfeiting<br />
their right <strong>to</strong> return and regain their property in their<br />
place of origin. At the same time, the authorities were<br />
resistant <strong>to</strong> allowing international aid and development<br />
agencies and donors <strong>to</strong> help IDPs shift from a<br />
state of dependency <strong>to</strong> self-reliance by providing support<br />
for livelihoods. Since the early 1990s, almost half<br />
of IDPs have continued <strong>to</strong> live in the dilapidated and<br />
overcrowded “collective centers” that were established<br />
in schools, dormi<strong>to</strong>ries, fac<strong>to</strong>ries and even functioning<br />
hospitals and were intended <strong>to</strong> serve only as temporary<br />
emergency shelter. 139<br />
The situation began <strong>to</strong> change following the “Rose<br />
Revolution” of 2003, which brought in<strong>to</strong> power the<br />
government of President Saakashvili. The new administration,<br />
while maintaining the policy of promoting the<br />
right <strong>to</strong> return, nonetheless slowly began <strong>to</strong> modify the<br />
absolutist approach that impeded any effort <strong>to</strong> improve<br />
conditions, at least in the interim, for IDPs in their place<br />
139 UN Commission on Human Rights, Report of the<br />
Representative of the Secretary-General on Internally<br />
Displaced Persons, Mr. Francis Deng—Addendum: Profiles<br />
in Displacement: Georgia, 2001, paras. 25–69.<br />
154<br />
of displacement. This significant policy shift was formalized<br />
with the government’s adoption in February<br />
2007 of the State Strategy for Internally Displaced<br />
Persons, which marked the government’s first-ever<br />
recognition that solutions <strong>to</strong> displacement other than<br />
return—including supporting efforts <strong>to</strong>ward local integration<br />
and securing dignified living conditions for<br />
IDPs in their place of displacement—were a legitimate<br />
policy goal. In practice, however, return continued <strong>to</strong> be<br />
emphasized, as reflected in the action plan for implementing<br />
the State Strategy.<br />
Yet following the August 2008 renewal of hostilities and<br />
the subsequent recognition by the Russian Federation<br />
and a handful of other countries of Abkhazia and South<br />
Ossetia as independent states, the government and<br />
population of Georgia have come <strong>to</strong> the realization<br />
that return is not a viable option for most IDPs in the<br />
foreseeable future. Beginning with the “new” 2008 IDPs<br />
and then eventually including the “old” protracted IDPs,<br />
the government began <strong>to</strong> implement the second goal of<br />
the strategy: supporting improved living conditions for<br />
IDPs in their place of displacement. The focus is heavily<br />
but not exclusively on providing adequate shelter, and<br />
by May 2010, the Ministry for Foreign Affairs had announced<br />
that durable housing solutions were provided<br />
for 20,800 people displaced by the August 2008 conflict<br />
and for 10,911 families displaced from earlier conflicts.<br />
However, at times the process of implementing the shelter<br />
program, which in some cases entails moving IDPs <strong>to</strong><br />
new locations elsewhere in the country, has been tense<br />
and problematic. In particular, IDP discontent escalated<br />
in the summer of 2010 after the government announced<br />
that thirty-six collective centers were not eligible for<br />
privatization and would be evacuated and the residents<br />
offered alternative accommodation in villages outside of<br />
the city (where most of the affected IDP families refused<br />
<strong>to</strong> move) or financial compensation of $10,000. The affected<br />
IDPs staged mass demonstrations, at which one<br />
IDP woman immolated herself in protest. 140 The Public<br />
140 ‘Self -Immolation Incident Highlights Desperation of<br />
Georgian IDPs,’ Radio Free Europe / Radio Liberty, 29<br />
Oc<strong>to</strong>ber 2010.