From Responsibility to Response: Assessing National - Brookings
From Responsibility to Response: Assessing National - Brookings
From Responsibility to Response: Assessing National - Brookings
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CHAPTER 2 Case Studies: Georgia, Kenya, Afghanistan and Sri Lanka<br />
exile did little <strong>to</strong> discourage those rumours. At the same<br />
time, the authorities resisted allowing international aid<br />
and development agencies and donors <strong>to</strong> help IDPs shift<br />
from a state of dependency <strong>to</strong> self-reliance by providing<br />
support for livelihoods. While some IDP children<br />
attended regular schools, several “parallel” schools for<br />
IDP children were set up and run by the Abkhaz government<br />
in exile, which, in anticipation of eventual return,<br />
sought <strong>to</strong> recreate and maintain children’s educational<br />
experience in their area of origin, even by organizing<br />
classes for IDPs with the same teacher and classmates<br />
as they had in their place of origin. In addition <strong>to</strong> being<br />
obstructed from meaningful participation in the socioeconomic<br />
and political life of the local communities,<br />
almost half of IDPs have lived since the early 1990s in<br />
dilapidated and overcrowded “collective centers,” which<br />
were established in schools, dormi<strong>to</strong>ries, fac<strong>to</strong>ries and<br />
even functioning hospitals and intended only <strong>to</strong> serve<br />
as temporary emergency shelter. 181 Already in 1999, the<br />
buildings were assessed <strong>to</strong> be in very poor or poor condition,<br />
and by 2003, 70 percent of units were found not<br />
<strong>to</strong> meet minimum shelter standards. In 2005, during his<br />
first mission <strong>to</strong> the country, RSG Walter Kälin observed<br />
that he was “shocked by the misery in which thousands<br />
of IDPs are still living, more than a decade after the violent<br />
fighting that caused them <strong>to</strong> flee their homes.” 182<br />
The international community—in particular humanitarian<br />
agencies and NGOs in Georgia as well as both<br />
RSG Deng following his mission <strong>to</strong> Georgia in 2000 and<br />
RSG Kälin following his first mission <strong>to</strong> the country in<br />
2005—long had advocated that the government change<br />
181 UN Commission on Human Rights, Report of the<br />
Representative of the Secretary-General on Internally<br />
Displaced Persons, Mr. Francis Deng—Addendum: Profiles<br />
in Displacement: Georgia, 2001, paras. 25–69.<br />
182 International Federation of the Red Cross (IFRC),<br />
Survey of Collective Centers Accommodating Internally<br />
Displaced Persons, 1999 (Tbilisi: 2000); UN Office for the<br />
Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), Georgia<br />
Humanitarian Situation Strategy 2004 (November 2003)<br />
(http://reliefweb.int/node/138045); Walter Kälin, “Georgia<br />
Must Act on Promises <strong>to</strong> End Displacement Crisis,” 2006<br />
(www.brookings.edu/articles/2006/0531georgia_kalin.<br />
aspx?rssid=georgia).<br />
216<br />
its approach <strong>to</strong> solutions for IDPs. In particular, they<br />
wanted the government <strong>to</strong> s<strong>to</strong>p viewing the right of IDPs<br />
<strong>to</strong> return and their right <strong>to</strong> live in dignified conditions<br />
in their place of displacement as mutually exclusive;<br />
instead, both were rights that should be respected in<br />
parallel and that even could be mutually reinforcing. 183<br />
While fledgling steps were taken by the government,<br />
at international urging, <strong>to</strong> move in this direction, most<br />
notably with the “New Approach” <strong>to</strong> IDP assistance<br />
promoted by the international community beginning<br />
in 2000, the policy and practices of the government did<br />
not fundamentally change. 184<br />
However, new opportunities opened up following the<br />
Rose Revolution of 2003, which brought in<strong>to</strong> power the<br />
government of President Saakashvili. While maintaining<br />
the policy of promoting the right of IDPs and refugees<br />
<strong>to</strong> return, the new administration began <strong>to</strong> modify<br />
its absolutist approach of impeding alternative, or at<br />
least interim, solutions for IDPs in their place of displacement.<br />
This significant policy shift was formalized<br />
with the government’s adoption in February 2007 of<br />
the State Strategy for Internally Displaced Persons (see<br />
Benchmark 6). The strategy articulates two main goals<br />
for government policy: <strong>to</strong> create conditions for the dignified<br />
and safe return of IDPs; and <strong>to</strong> support dignified<br />
living conditions, in terms of both housing and overall<br />
socioeconomic conditions, for IDPs in their current<br />
places of residence. The strategy marked the government’s<br />
first-ever recognition that solutions other than<br />
return, specifically local integration, were a legitimate<br />
183 See UN Commission on Human Rights, Report of the<br />
Representative of the Secretary-General on Internally<br />
Displaced persons, Mr. Francis Deng—Addendum: Profiles<br />
in Displacement: Georgia, 2001, paras. 105–111, 128 and<br />
130(xii); UN Commission on Human Rights, Report of the<br />
Representative of the Secretary-General on the Human Rights<br />
of Internally Displaced persons, Walter Kälin—Mission <strong>to</strong><br />
Georgia (21 <strong>to</strong> 24 December 2005), 2006, para. 15.<br />
184 UN Commission on Human Rights, Report of the<br />
Representative of the Secretary-General on Internally<br />
Displaced Persons, Mr. Francis Deng—Addendum: Profiles<br />
in Displacement: Georgia, 2001, paras. 108–128 and 130.