From Responsibility to Response: Assessing National - Brookings

CHAPTER 1 Assessing National Approaches to Internal Displacement: Findings from 15 Countries
largely unaddressed by the Iraqi government as well as
the international humanitarian community.” 73 However,
the government has taken some measures to adjudicate
property disputes for this group of IDPs, as discussed
below.
As have other governments, the Iraqi government has
given priority to return over other solutions (see below).
However, at the time of writing, only a few hundred
thousand post-2006 IDPs had returned, and return was
unlikely for many of the remaining IDPs, given threats
to their lives; insecurity; damage to, destruction of, or
lack of access to housing; poor access to water and basic
services; and limited economic opportunities. Indeed,
while obstacles to return have varied by governorate
and over time, a combination of those factors has precluded
return or has resulted in further displacement of
returnees. IDPs who have returned have tended to do
so in areas where security has improved and where they
can find employment. 74
With respect to factors inhibiting return, according to
UNHCR in December 2009, nearly 36 percent of IDPs
reported that their property had been damaged or destroyed;
18 percent reported that it was being occupied
illegally by militias, local residents or other IDPs; and
many feared harassment should they attempt to reclaim
their property. Fifteen percent of returned IDPs and
over half of returned refugees (56 percent) were unable
73 IDMC, Iraq: Overview: Political Wrangling Leaves around
2.8 Million Displaced Iraqis with No Durable Solutions in
Sight, 2010, p. 7 (www.internal-displacement.org).
74 IOM, IOM Emergency Needs Assessment: Four Years of Post-
Samarra Displacement in Iraq, 13 April 2010 (http://reliefweb.int/node/351148).
According to IOM in its assessment
of post-2006 IDPs, «Families who choose to return to their
place of origin base their decision on several factors, ranging
from improved security in their place of origin to the
harsh conditions they face during displacement. It is usually
a combination of factors, but IOM field monitors find that
families are generally more likely to return to their homes
if the security situation has improved and they are able to
secure employment.» See IOM, Review of Displacement and
Return in Iraq, February 2011.
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to access their property. 75 According to an April 2010
report of the International Organization for Migration
(IOM), the 375,000 IDPs who had returned attributed
their decision to do so to a combination of improved
security in the area of return, onerous conditions in
displacement, and government and other assistance. 76
Further, UNHCR has reported that returnees were
mainly Shi’a and Sunni Arabs who tended to return to
areas under the control of their communities, with approximately
58 percent of IDP returns having occurred
within the same governorate, principally in Baghdad
and Diyala. 77 By the end of 2009, only 40 percent of returnees
surveyed by IOM had registered and applied for
a government grant and only 30 percent of applicants
had received one.
These conditions help to explain the fact that since
2006, according to IOM’s regular surveys, the proportion
of IDP families whose preferred option was local
integration increased from 25 percent in 2006 to 44 percent
as of February 2011 across Iraq, with an increase in
Babylon governorate from 77 percent to 87 percent over
the same period. The corresponding percentages remained
high in Basrah (77 percent), Najaf (70 percent),
and Qadissiya (67 percent) governorates. The percentage
of IOM-surveyed IDP families desiring resettlement
to a third location decreased while the number of families
wishing to return to their place of origin increased
in 2008, from 45 percent to 60 percent, but decreased to
35 percent in October 2010. 78
With respect to the pre-2003 IDPs, the government
has supported positive steps to realize durable solutions,
including establishment of the Commission for
75 UNHCR, “UNHCR Reiterates Concern about Involuntary
Returns to Iraq Amid Violence,” 11 December 2009 (www.
unhcr.org/4b222efe9.html).
76 IOM, IOM Emergency Needs Assessment: Four Years of
Post-Samarra Displacement in Iraq, 13 April 2010.
77 UNHCR, UNHCR Iraq Operation Monthly Statistical
Update on Return: August 2010 (www.iauiraq.org).
78 IOM, IOM Iraq Report: Five Years of Post-Samarra
Displacement, February 2011, p. 18 (http://reliefweb.int/
node/389935).