The North Atlantic Fisheries, 1100-1976 - University of Hull
The North Atlantic Fisheries, 1100-1976 - University of Hull
The North Atlantic Fisheries, 1100-1976 - University of Hull
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production capacity <strong>of</strong> all the fish factories in the Faroe Islands was fully<br />
sufficient for an annual supply <strong>of</strong> raw material <strong>of</strong> above 400,000 tons.<br />
Total catches around the Faroes have never reached more than 120,000<br />
tons.<br />
<strong>The</strong> basis <strong>of</strong> the resources for the fish factories in the 1970s and 1980s<br />
was mostly home fishing. <strong>The</strong> general shift <strong>of</strong> the fishing zones to 200<br />
miles—this happened in the Faroes on 1 January 1977—brought with it a<br />
reduction <strong>of</strong> the unlimited fishing <strong>of</strong> the Faroese in the <strong>North</strong> <strong>Atlantic</strong>,<br />
and more and more fishing vessels, including large trawlers, had to fish<br />
in the local Faroese waters, which in the beginning meant that the supply<br />
<strong>of</strong> raw fish for the fish factories was good. In other words, at the same<br />
time as the means <strong>of</strong> production expanded, the basis <strong>of</strong> the fishing<br />
resources grew smaller due to the expansion <strong>of</strong> other countries’ fishing<br />
zones and the growing quota regulations. <strong>The</strong> result was that the Faroese<br />
started to deplete their own resources.<br />
In itself, the concept <strong>of</strong> village development was sound and could<br />
have been realized, if it had not been so tightly connected with a<br />
disastrous technological fixation and extreme capitalization <strong>of</strong> the whole<br />
production process. <strong>The</strong> many different subsidies have also given a false<br />
sense <strong>of</strong> security, and they were also a direct incitement for further<br />
investment.<br />
In addition to a number <strong>of</strong> companies with fewer owners, new forms<br />
<strong>of</strong> ownership came into existence. <strong>The</strong>se involved trade unions, local and<br />
central authorities, and private interests. <strong>The</strong>re was nothing wrong in this<br />
<strong>of</strong> course; on the contrary, it strengthened the internal relationships <strong>of</strong> the<br />
village. Somehow the production apparatus became an integrated part <strong>of</strong><br />
local emotions, something with which everybody in the village could<br />
identify. It became the flesh and the pulse <strong>of</strong> the village. People refused<br />
therefore to give up, and they were determined to start all over again if<br />
the fish factory ran into economic difficulties.<br />
<strong>The</strong> interests <strong>of</strong> Faroese society were intertwined in a complicated<br />
network, in which it was difficult for critical voices to get attention, and<br />
there was also the fact that the Faroe Islands were not the well-defined<br />
economic zone which some people may have imagined. <strong>The</strong> Faroes were<br />
an attractive market for Danish, Norwegian and other countries' financial<br />
interests. Danish building societies and other financial institutions did<br />
not see any danger in pumping a lot <strong>of</strong> money into businesses in the<br />
Faroes, including the fish factories. Neither did the shipyards in Norway<br />
and elsewhere have any problems in getting loans for the building <strong>of</strong><br />
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