Twenty-First Century Populism: The Spectre of Western European ...

Italy 89
who continued to promote themselves as the genuine interpreters of the
‘real country’, at war against the arrogant ‘legal country’. The anti-establishment
message of the party, independently of the success obtained in the North,
provoked attention and imitation in other parts of the country, contributing
to the strong growth, in the 1990 local elections, in the number of protest
lists from outside the main parties and to an increase in abstentionism −
which jumped from 8.4 per cent in 1976 to a maximum of 19.1 per cent − above
all in the South, where the Lega could not directly attract support for its
anti-southern polemics and where home-grown movements had not yet
emerged. The electoral potential of populism thus became a crucial element
in the dynamics of the political system.
Proud isolation, however, ceased being of benefit to the Lega following its
success in the 1992 general election (when it gained 8.7 per cent of the
national vote, including more than 17 per cent in the North), due to the
change from proportional representation to a predominantly majoritarian
electoral system first at local level in 1993, and then at national level in
1994. This naturally favoured those parties, unlike the Lega, willing to form
coalitions. Having rejected this option at the 1993 local elections, when it
stood alone against candidates of the Left, the Centre and the Right, the
party had to accept that, however solid its electoral base, this would generally
not be enough to win against opponents grouped together in a coalition
(the only exception among the big cities being Milan where, from 1993 to
1997, Marco Formentini served as mayor), especially those on the Left. The
risk of being abandoned by a large part of the electorate which it had won
over in the preceding years − who were attracted by the party’s populist
message, but eager to back winning alternatives to the Left in a climate of
ever-more-acute polarization − led to the Lega’s decision in 1994 to form an
alliance with Silvio Berlusconi, who presented himself not only as a potent
fellow-traveller, but also as a potentially fierce competitor. As is well known,
the meeting/clash between the two most important Italian populist actors
produced opposing results: immediate success in the March 1994 general
election (albeit with a reduction in the Lega’s overall vote-share to below the
level reached two years previously, provoking fears of a vote drift towards
their new ally), but within months a bitter and acrimonious end to the alliance
and, hence, the government. This was followed by years of reciprocal
insults and accusations, before a rapprochement in 2000 and a new agreement
which ultimately led to general election success in 2001 and joint
participation in government until 2006.
The Lega Nord, or identity populism
Berlusconi and the Lega have offered two distinct varieties of populism,
sometimes conflicting, but more often complementary. In this lies both the
reason for the success, from 2000 onwards, of their alliance, and the roots