Twenty-First Century Populism: The Spectre of Western European ...

18 Twenty-First Century Populism
electorates will react to what they decide. The rule of anticipated reactions
[my emphasis] thus provides the linkage between input and output,
between the procedure (as stated by Schumpeter) and its consequences.
(Sartori, 1987: 152)
It must be added that, in these democratic competitions, it is in the interest
of leaders, both in government and in opposition, to acquire and distribute
all the necessary information for voters to make up their minds. Incidentally,
Sartori’s important consideration opens up the territory of ‘accountability’
(Przeworski et al., 1999), a relationship between voters and office holders
that must be largely grounded in the possibility of voters having enough
reliable information. Needless to say, accountability is a quality not especially
looked after nor provided for in the relationship that populist leaders
establish with their followers since those leaders lack or, rather, reject any
institutionalization of the mechanisms and procedures connecting them
with the people.
Schumpeter’s definition above was also accepted by William H. Riker
when working within the very different theoretical framework of social
choice. Indeed, Riker was even less demanding than Sartori. His definition
of democracy relies fully on an admittedly limited conception of liberalism
which he places in sharp contrast, as we will see, with populism. Riker (1982:
248) writes that: ‘Liberalism ... simply requires regular elections that sometimes
lead to the rejection of rulers’. However, he appropriately adds that the
preservation of democracy is grounded on the existence of constitutional
limitations. Indeed, we should not forget that, in the past twenty years or so,
a practical and significant distinction has emerged between electoral democracies
and liberal democracies. It is this combination of ‘regular elections
plus constitutional limitations’ that produces the kind of democracy James
Madison had in mind and that has been embedded into the US Constitution
(Dahl, 1956). Thus, while there may be many ‘electoral’ democracies in the
world today, there are far fewer ‘liberal democracies’ (Diamond and Plattner,
2001). While liberal democracies offer an, admittedly not insurmountable,
obstacle to the insurgence of populism, electoral democracies often become
easy prey for populist challengers because they lack a solid and legitimate
network of political and institutional mechanisms and structures. Also,
newly created electoral democracies may lack structured parties and a stable
party system. Perhaps, as argued by Alfio Mastropaolo in his chapter in this
book, the decline of parties and the breakdown of party systems (e.g. the
Italian one) are responsible for opening enough political space for populist
phenomena. Successful contemporary democracies combine a precise definition
of the rights of citizens, including the right of association, which is
usually translated into the formation of political parties able and willing to
compete according to precise political and electoral rules, alongside representative
and governmental institutions. It is important to underline that,