Twenty-First Century Populism: The Spectre of Western European ...

156 Twenty-First Century Populism
After the booming 1990s, exports and consumption stagnated, investments
declined and, in 2002, unemployment began to rise. Given the relative
weakness of opposition to the purple coalition − the largest opposition party,
the CDA, was hamstrung by internal conflicts and leadership changes − the
economic problems offered a potential opportunity to be exploited by a new
populist party. However, when Dutch voters went to the polls in May 2002,
they may not yet have felt the full effects of recession. Wages continued to
rise in 2002 (CBS, 2003: 22) and most voters evaluated the government’s
economic performance quite favourably (52 per cent), particularly in the
area of employment (66 per cent) (Van Holsteyn and Irwin, 2003: 54−5).
Nevertheless, the governing parties should not have expected gratitude
from the voters. When asked to name the two most important political
issues at the time, only six per cent mentioned (the lack of) economic growth
(Van Praag, 2003: 108; see also Kleinnijenhuis et al., 2003: 50). Rather, voters
expressed concern about questions such as crime and security (53 per cent
mentioned it as one of the two most important policy areas), health care
(38 per cent) and asylum policy (21 per cent). 2 Unfortunately for the PvdA,
VVD and D66, they had neglected these areas − at least in the eyes of many
journalists and voters (Kleinnijenhuis et al., 2003: 49−53, 128−30). The press
tended to emphasize the failures of the government, rather than its
achievements, and focused on hospital waiting lists, teacher shortages and
street crime.
Insecurity was often associated with immigrants − perhaps not so much
by journalists as much as among the public at large. A growing number of
native citizens expressed negative feelings about immigrants, multiculturalism
and Islam (Gijsberts, 2005: 193−7). Most Dutch Muslims were migrant
workers (or their descendants) from Morocco and Turkey or immigrants
from the former Dutch colonies of Indonesia and Surinam. A smaller number
were refugees from Iran, Iraq or Somalia. The number of Muslims had
increased from 0.4 per cent of the population in 1971 to four per cent in
1995 and almost six per cent by 2005 (Shadid and Van Koningsveld, 1997:
20−1; CBS 2006). At first, many of them may have intended to return to
their country of origin after earning some money in the Netherlands.
However, most immigrants ended up staying and adapting − with some difficulty
and often reluctantly − to Dutch society. Some set up Islamic schools,
student clubs, an Islamic broadcasting association and (local) political parties
(Shadid and Van Koningsveld, 1997: 161−82, 208−13; Landman, 1992:
255−9, 260−9, 273−5). One might say they were trying to build an Islamic
pillar, in line with Dutch traditions. However, due to inexperience and
ethnic/religious differences (Sunnites, Shi’ites, Ahmadiyas, and so on), they
achieved only modest success (Shadid and Van Koningsveld, 1997: 172).
In spite of its slow and uneven growth, the small Islamic pillar-underconstruction
might have worried Dutch people who felt pillars belonged to
the past and that religion should disappear from the public realm. These