Twenty-First Century Populism: The Spectre of Western European ...
Twenty-First Century Populism: The Spectre of Western European ...
Twenty-First Century Populism: The Spectre of Western European ...
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176 <strong>Twenty</strong>-<strong>First</strong> <strong>Century</strong> <strong>Populism</strong><br />
view that there are too many immigrants and who also expressed a low<br />
degree <strong>of</strong> ‘political satisfaction’, 27 per cent voted for Le Pen.<br />
<strong>Populism</strong> and the power <strong>of</strong> the ‘anti-political<br />
establishment’ strategy<br />
<strong>The</strong> Front National holds a clearly populist view <strong>of</strong> society as ‘ultimately<br />
separated into two homogeneous and antagonistic groups, the “pure”<br />
people versus “the corrupt elite” ’ (Mudde, 2004: 543) and its populist anti-<br />
Establishment strategy has been crucial to the success <strong>of</strong> the party. <strong>Populism</strong><br />
is characterized by<br />
(a) hostility towards the idea <strong>of</strong> representative democracy (within a democratic<br />
context, this may manifest itself in calls for direct democracy);<br />
(b) an image <strong>of</strong> ‘the people’ as a harmonious and homogeneous community,<br />
pitted against ‘the political class’ or ‘the Establishment’;<br />
(c) the idea that the populist party or leader represents ‘the voice <strong>of</strong> the<br />
people’.<br />
In Weberian terms, populist movements are charismatic, and try to base<br />
their appeal and legitimacy primarily on emotions rather than on rational<br />
considerations (cf. Weber, 1978: chapter 3).<br />
Populist ideology and rhetoric accord an essential role to the idea <strong>of</strong> ‘the<br />
people’. However, the term is ambiguous. <strong>The</strong> lines <strong>of</strong> inclusion are <strong>of</strong>ten<br />
very fuzzy and populists are typically clearer about which groups are to be<br />
excluded. As Paul Taggart (2000: 96) has suggested, the lines <strong>of</strong> exclusion<br />
<strong>of</strong>ten correspond to ethnonationalist or ethnoregional identities. This<br />
implies that populists <strong>of</strong>ten are ethnonationalist (which does not necessary<br />
mean that all or even most ethnonationalists are populists).<br />
However, although the party’s conception <strong>of</strong> democracy is a form <strong>of</strong> populist<br />
Herrenvolk democracy, or ethnocracy, the Front National differs from<br />
earlier French Right-wing extremist parties and movements in its selfproclaimed<br />
acceptance <strong>of</strong> democracy (cf. Marcus, 1995: 102). Rather, the FN<br />
is critical <strong>of</strong> existing, representative democracy, which it argues, is ‘a democracy<br />
<strong>of</strong> appearance’. According to the party, there is a deep gulf between the<br />
people and the political elite, and it is ultimately because <strong>of</strong> the existence <strong>of</strong><br />
this gulf that it rejects the idea <strong>of</strong> representative democracy (Souchard et al.,<br />
1997: 135−136). In common with most other RRP parties, therefore, the<br />
Front National supports direct democracy (cf. Mény and Surel, 2000: 61).<br />
In order to mobilize protest votes, the Front National has used the ‘antipolitical-establishment<br />
strategy’. A party using this strategy tries to construct<br />
an image <strong>of</strong> itself in opposition to the ‘political class’, while simultan eously<br />
trying not to appear anti-democratic. A party that is viewed as antidemocratic<br />
runs the risk <strong>of</strong> being stigmatized and marginalized as long as