Twenty-First Century Populism: The Spectre of Western European ...
Twenty-First Century Populism: The Spectre of Western European ...
Twenty-First Century Populism: The Spectre of Western European ...
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Germany 133<br />
backs <strong>of</strong> the former Communists (who were firmly established in the East),<br />
something it could scarcely have managed under its own steam.<br />
<strong>The</strong> electoral vacuum created by the perceived defection <strong>of</strong> the Social<br />
Democrats to the neo-liberal mainstream and the refusal <strong>of</strong> the SPD to<br />
cooperate with the former Communists at federal level, coupled with the<br />
simultaneous weakness <strong>of</strong> right-wing populism and extremism, <strong>of</strong>fers great<br />
opportunities for <strong>The</strong> Left Party, into which the PDS has now mutated, and<br />
will continue to do so (Lösche, 2003). Whether the party can take them, <strong>of</strong><br />
course, depends primarily on its own agency, as in the case <strong>of</strong> the populists<br />
on the Right. From the resolution <strong>of</strong> the leadership issue following the foreseeable<br />
retirement <strong>of</strong> Gysi and Lafontaine to the culturally based differences<br />
in mentality between the more idealistically minded WASG in the West and<br />
the PDS with its pragmatic image in the East, to the internal power struggles<br />
that are something <strong>of</strong> a tradition in the PDS, there are so many imponderables<br />
and pitfalls that a firm prediction scarcely seems possible. It does<br />
appear likely, however, that left-wing populism will continue to find a more<br />
hospitable habitat than its right-wing counterpart in the German political<br />
system for some time to come.<br />
<strong>The</strong> outlook for populism in Germany<br />
Periods <strong>of</strong> economic downturn, structural crises, anxiety about the future<br />
and general pessimism create conditions in which populist formations on<br />
the Right and Left may thrive. This applies in Germany too, where the party<br />
system has hitherto been marked by a relatively high degree <strong>of</strong> stability.<br />
Many authors ascribe the lack <strong>of</strong> success <strong>of</strong> right-wing populist parties in<br />
Germany to the fact that populism is a constant in Germany, both within<br />
the established parties and in the media − the tabloid newspaper Bild being<br />
a prime example. And indeed the search for scapegoats for the fraught<br />
economic situation in 2005 induced not only members <strong>of</strong> <strong>The</strong> Left Party<br />
close to Gregor Gysi and Oskar Lafontaine, but also politicians from the<br />
mainstream parties such as CSU party leader Edmund Stoiber to engage in<br />
populist tub-thumping.<br />
In Germany, then, it is by no means impossible to mobilize public opinion<br />
on typically right-wing populist issues, from immigration policy and<br />
law and order to criticism <strong>of</strong> the <strong>European</strong> Union. In the past, however, the<br />
mainstream parties have managed to take the sting out <strong>of</strong> these issues or<br />
have incorporated them into their own policy positions, thereby leaving<br />
potential challengers with little room for manoeuvre. Moreover, right-wing<br />
populist parties in Germany have faced two other obstacles: first, they operate<br />
in an extremely sensitive area in which, because <strong>of</strong> the country’s Nazi<br />
past, they are wide open to stigmatization by the public and the media.<br />
Second, they have to deal with serious organizational problems, which can<br />
at best be temporarily sidestepped through the presence <strong>of</strong> a charismatic