Twenty-First Century Populism: The Spectre of Western European ...
Twenty-First Century Populism: The Spectre of Western European ...
Twenty-First Century Populism: The Spectre of Western European ...
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Britain 187<br />
had been established as the mainstream position in the Conservative party.<br />
More importantly, the bulk <strong>of</strong> public opinion had also moved in this direction.<br />
Although the Labour party has moved in the opposite direction, shedding<br />
its earlier scepticism (which peaked with a platform <strong>of</strong> withdrawal in<br />
1983) and adopting a Europhile position by the early 1990s, its leadership has<br />
been forced to exercise caution on key policy questions such as the single currency,<br />
given public hostility. Surveys <strong>of</strong> British Social Attitudes have indicated<br />
strong public desire to reduce the EU’s influence (this has hovered between<br />
50−60 per cent since the mid-1990s) (Evans and Butt, 2005: 198−200).<br />
Although by the end <strong>of</strong> the 1990s the Conservative party had adopted a<br />
highly Euro-sceptical platform, in some cases implying renegotiation <strong>of</strong> key<br />
tenets <strong>of</strong> membership, it has found itself outflanked by a number <strong>of</strong> new<br />
movements able to exploit the increasing public hostility to the <strong>European</strong><br />
integration process, fuelled by the Europhobia <strong>of</strong> large swathes <strong>of</strong> the British<br />
press (including both populist tabloids and broadsheets). While political<br />
pragmatism, its relationship with the business community and the persistence<br />
<strong>of</strong> a Europhile minority within the party prevent the Conservatives<br />
from adopting a platform <strong>of</strong> withdrawal from the EU, these new Eurosceptic<br />
movements operate with no such constraints, combining a populist anti-EU<br />
discourse with promises to withdraw the UK from the EU. <strong>The</strong> most prominent<br />
<strong>of</strong> these movements is the UK Independence party (see discussion<br />
below).<br />
Chris Gifford has argued that ideas <strong>of</strong> ‘Britishness’ have been asserted<br />
within the Eurosceptic movement (both within the Conservative party and<br />
beyond) that suggest that British political development (given the legacy <strong>of</strong><br />
empire and ‘global power’ status) is ‘exceptional and antithetical to the continent’<br />
(Gifford, 2006: 854). Gifford argues that ‘in a context <strong>of</strong> imperial<br />
decline, the nation has had to be persistently regenerated and there has<br />
been a need for an “other” against which a “new” Britain can be redefined.<br />
Since the 1970s, “Europe”, and more specifically the project <strong>of</strong> <strong>European</strong><br />
integration, has played such a role’ (Gifford, 2006: 856). As Gifford shows,<br />
much <strong>of</strong> the discourse used by the Eurosceptic movement has been <strong>of</strong> a<br />
populist nature, alleging that the British people have been sold out and lied<br />
to by its leaders, who can no longer be trusted on the issue. For example, the<br />
Heath government, which took Britain into the EC in 1973 stands accused<br />
<strong>of</strong> having misled parliament in claiming that Britain would retain its essential<br />
sovereignty, as did the cross-party coalition that supported continued<br />
membership in the 1975 referendum and thereafter.<br />
Mainstream populism in Britain<br />
Margaret Thatcher’s leadership <strong>of</strong> the Conservative party and Britain in the<br />
1980s has <strong>of</strong>ten been characterized as populist, reflected in an apparent