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Twenty-First Century Populism: The Spectre of Western European ...

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20 <strong>Twenty</strong>-<strong>First</strong> <strong>Century</strong> <strong>Populism</strong><br />

seems appropriate to conclude this preliminary discussion <strong>of</strong> the differences<br />

between liberal and populist democracy with a long quote from an unjustifiably<br />

neglected scholar, William Kornhauser (1959: 131):<br />

Populist democracy involves direct action <strong>of</strong> large numbers <strong>of</strong> people,<br />

which <strong>of</strong>ten results in the circumvention <strong>of</strong> institutional channels and<br />

ad hoc invasion <strong>of</strong> individual privacy. Liberal democracy involves political<br />

action mediated by institutional rules, and therefore limitations on<br />

the use <strong>of</strong> power by majorities as well as minorities. <strong>The</strong> difference<br />

between liberal democracy and populist democracy, then, does not concern<br />

who shall have access to power (in both cases, there is representative<br />

rule); rather, it concerns how power shall be sought, the mode <strong>of</strong> access.<br />

In liberal democracy, the mode <strong>of</strong> access tends to be controlled by institutional<br />

procedures and intermediate associations, whereas in populist<br />

democracy the mode <strong>of</strong> access tends to be more direct and unrestrained.<br />

<strong>The</strong> next section will deal with the ‘ideological’ conditions which indicate<br />

the possibility and acceptability <strong>of</strong> one or the other mode <strong>of</strong> access to political<br />

power, and the social conditions that shape an environment conducive<br />

to populism.<br />

Ideological conditions<br />

To suggest that there exists a precise, widely shared, cogent populist ideology<br />

would be an exaggeration. In any case, it seems advisable to use the<br />

term in the plural: ‘ideologies’. Since the discrepancies among the different<br />

ideologies are many and wide and the ‘structure’ <strong>of</strong> the various ideologies<br />

not especially cogent, but shaky and fluid, it is preferable in the case <strong>of</strong> populism<br />

to speak <strong>of</strong> ‘mentalities’ (states <strong>of</strong> mind) instead <strong>of</strong> ideologies, much the<br />

same way as Juan Linz (2000: Ch. 4) suggested when defining authoritarian<br />

regimes. Our task, therefore, is to identify more precisely the components <strong>of</strong><br />

these mentalities in order to see which <strong>of</strong> them, if any, are common to all<br />

populist experiences. One component is always present: the idea that the<br />

people are always far better than their rulers and that rulers <strong>of</strong>ten betray the<br />

interests and preferences <strong>of</strong> the people. As argued in the introduction to this<br />

volume, a clear antagonistic line is drawn between, on the one hand, the elites/<br />

Establishment and, on the other, the (common) people. No matter who<br />

succeeds in ‘awakening’ and mobilizing the people and, pour cause, becomes<br />

the populist leader, the enemies are those in power, and, in some cases,<br />

other selected groups: financial tycoons, intellectuals, journalists − in a<br />

sense all those who are definitely not part <strong>of</strong> the common people, who<br />

simply do not belong to them. On the contrary, almost by definition, populist<br />

leaders embrace the ideas and mentalities <strong>of</strong> the people and identify with<br />

them. Populist leaders do not represent the people, rather they consider

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