Twenty-First Century Populism: The Spectre of Western European ...

The Republic of Ireland 215
future and, if it does, it will find many of the same opportunities around
which populist parties elsewhere in Western Europe have successfully mobilized
over the last two decades. Of course, the climate for populism in
Ireland could be better. For example, greater politicization of immigration
and European integration over the coming years would clearly favour a populist
breakthrough. Indeed, given the numbers of immigrants who have
arrived in Ireland over the last decade and the fact that the country will
have to get used to an EU in which it has obligations and duties rather than
privileges and handouts, this is quite likely. Public anxiety about a downturn
in the economy and an increase in salience of the secular/clerical
cleavage would also facilitate the rise of populism and, again, both of those
are liable to happen at some point over the next decade. Most importantly,
perhaps, a decline in the fortunes of Sinn Féin would open up a significant
space in the electoral market for a new populist party, whether of the Left or
the Right.
Along with the existence of a capable, charismatic leader, however, a sine
qua non for populist success is what has been termed as an ‘antipolitical climate’
or a widespread sense of ‘political malaise’ (Mastropaolo, 2000; 2005),
that is the loss of trust in, and development of cynicism about, political
institutions and actors. From this perspective it is interesting to consider, as
John Coakley notes, that while a 1990 survey showed the Irish were more
likely than others in Europe to have confidence in their institutions, ‘by
1997 this position had changed ... trust in parliament was low, comparable
with the position elsewhere in Europe, and trust in political parties was
lower still: 72 per cent distrusted them’ (Coakley, 1999: 56–57). Likewise, it
is worth noting that, in his study of newspaper coverage of the 2002 general
election campaign, Heinz Brandenburg (2005: 297) finds that the most significant
aspect was ‘the predominantly negative attitude of all Irish print
media towards political actors ... in Ireland we seem to be faced with a rather
homogeneous anti-politics bias’. Finally, as a May 2006 opinion poll published
in The Irish Times reported, 42 per cent of Irish voters believed that
the next general election would make no difference to how the country is
run and 36 per cent felt it would make only a minor difference. 57 per cent
said it would make no difference to their lives personally (Brennock, 2006).
If, as Canovan (1999) argues, therefore, populists exploit the decline of the
‘redemptive’ and the rise of the ‘pragmatic’ face of democracy, then the
prospects for a populist party in Ireland seem rather good indeed. Whenever
the dog decides to bark, of course.
Notes
1. I would like to thank Michael Gallagher, Peter Mair, Alfio Mastropaolo and Eoin
O’Malley for their comments on an earlier version of this chapter. Thanks also to
David Connolly for proofreading the final draft and to Daragh O’Connell both