Twenty-First Century Populism: The Spectre of Western European ...
Twenty-First Century Populism: The Spectre of Western European ...
Twenty-First Century Populism: The Spectre of Western European ...
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14<br />
Conclusion: <strong>Populism</strong> and<br />
<strong>Twenty</strong>-<strong>First</strong> <strong>Century</strong> <strong>Western</strong><br />
<strong>European</strong> Democracy<br />
Daniele Albertazzi and Duncan McDonnell<br />
Whose democracy is it anyway?<br />
Gerry Stoker concludes his recent book Why Politics Matters by affirming:<br />
‘Achieving mass democracy was the great triumph <strong>of</strong> the twentieth century.<br />
Learning to live with it will be the great achievement <strong>of</strong> the twenty-first’<br />
(Stoker, 2006: 206). Like Stoker, a whole series <strong>of</strong> scholars at the beginning<br />
<strong>of</strong> the new millennium have argued that the pillars <strong>of</strong> representative liberal<br />
democracy − in particular, parties and popular participation − are creaking<br />
(Pharr and Putnam, 2000; Diamond and Gunther, 2001; Dalton and<br />
Wattenberg, 2002; Crouch, 2004). In fact, apart from the euphoric period<br />
surrounding the fall <strong>of</strong> the Berlin Wall and the seemingly inexorable move<br />
towards a united, peaceful, harmonious and liberal democratic Europe,<br />
there has long been a tendency to focus on the negative aspects <strong>of</strong> how<br />
<strong>Western</strong> <strong>European</strong> democracies function. Indeed, as we can see from even a<br />
brief glance at <strong>The</strong> Crisis <strong>of</strong> Democracy (Crozier, Huntington and Watanuki,<br />
1975), in the past the portents have been worse and the prophecies far<br />
gloomier. For example, in the opening paragraphs <strong>of</strong> that landmark volume,<br />
under the heading ‘<strong>The</strong> Current Pessimism about Democracy’, we find the<br />
comment by the former West German Chancellor Willy Brandt before leaving<br />
<strong>of</strong>fice that ‘<strong>Western</strong> Europe has only 20 or 30 more years <strong>of</strong> democracy<br />
left in it’ (ibid.: 2).<br />
With the end <strong>of</strong> the Cold War, the broad acceptance by all parties <strong>of</strong> the<br />
basic merits <strong>of</strong> democracy and the decline <strong>of</strong> political terrorism in <strong>Western</strong><br />
Europe, such apocalyptic scenarios are no longer being put forward.<br />
Nonetheless, as Robert Putnam, Susan Pharr and Russell Dalton (2000: 6)<br />
write in their introduction to Disaffected Democracies, while support for<br />
democracy per se appears to be greater then ever, faith in its agents (i.e.<br />
politicians and parties) and its institutions has declined. As they point out,<br />
the percentage <strong>of</strong> the public ‘expressing a partisan attachment has declined<br />
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