Twenty-First Century Populism: The Spectre of Western European ...

Switzerland 109
Not only, therefore, do all major parties need to be involved in the decisionmaking
process, but often interest and citizen organizations, too, as some of
them have the organizational muscle to veto legislation (Klöti, 2001: 24).
The system works so well, in fact, that since the introduction of the ‘Magic
Formula’ the proportion of bills challenged by referendum has fallen to
seven per cent (Papadopoulous, 2001: 40). Switzerland is thus characterized
by a system of ‘mutual accommodation’ (Lijphart, 1984; Linder, 2003a)
and must be studied alongside other ‘populist paradises’ such as Belgium
and Austria where the growth of anti-politics (to use Alfio Mastropaolo’s
terminology) has been impressive.
Arguably, in fact, consociational practices, far from being impediments,
provided very fertile ground indeed to the populist anti-system rhetoric of
the SVP/UDC. As important as they certainly were, anti-immigration and
law-and-order propaganda were underpinned by an idea that always provides
the very foundation of populist ideology: immigration may (theoretically
at least) cease completely and old foes may turn into friends; however,
the claim that a party is ready to ‘stand up alone’, come what may, and
defend the rights of the ‘people’ against a political system where all major
political actors (from both Left and Right) are basically the same is the populist
rhetoric’s sine qua non. They are ‘all in it’, self-serving, plotting behind
the backs of citizens and equally responsible for the ills affecting the country:
this is indeed the philosophy that has provided the cornerstone of the
SVP/UDC’s recent propaganda (see the programme for the 2003 national
elections, SVP/UDC, 2003: 12). Faithful to its mandate, the more its electoral
weight increases, the more the party claims to be uninterested in the
privileges and perks of office and only bent on delivering its programme
against anyone else (ibid., 6 and 7).
Faced with a powerful, if collegial executive, the Swiss parliament does
not even have the power to sack it. Moreover, parliament often lacks
courage − because controversial decisions could easily be overthrown by
popular votes − and is quite secretive in its proceedings, since most of the
work required to strike compromises on legislation is done by restricted
committees, where both the major parties and interest groups need representing.
Furthermore, ‘initiative entrepreneurs’ − i.e. people who pursue
their own agendas and use organizations such as AUNS to gain political
clout (Kobach, 1993: 134–136) − fully exploit the weakness of political parties
and can always threaten to take action if their grievances are ignored.
Often such groups are more cohesive (and, importantly, wealthier) than the
parties themselves, as discussed above. They can therefore afford to ‘buy’
the support of MPs, or exchange favours with them, not to mention that
some MPs are sent to parliament precisely thanks to the support of business
groups and/or associations. When several big groups (e.g. employer organizations,
financial associations or the big unions) agree to something, the
momentum created is irresistible (Mach, 2003). Far from being a democratic