Twenty-First Century Populism: The Spectre of Western European ...

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the overwhelming majority of the electorate is in favour of democracy per se
(Schedler, 1996; cf. Mudde, 1996a: 272). However, if, in the eyes of the voters,
an RRP party succeeds in detaching itself from anti-democratic currents,
it can attract voters beyond the small, marginalized groups of voters
that are prepared to support straightforward anti-democratic parties.
Part of the populist anti-establishment strategy is often also to criticize
the established parties for focusing on obsolete issues, while at the same time
suppressing political issues associated with the ‘real’ conflict between national
identity and multiculturalism. Moreover, the populist anti-Establishment
strategy makes it possible for parties to present themselves as the real champions
of true democracy and as a new kind of party which considers the
worries and interests of ‘the common man’ (see, e.g. Betz and Johnson, 2004;
Mudde, 2004).
If we look at the FN in terms of the first part of the above strategy, we can
clearly see that the party dismisses differences between socialist and established
non-socialist parties, in order to group them together into one ‘political
class’:
The rotation of power, which in the 5 th Republic represents a rule impossible
to evade, only involves, or is only expected to involve, the RPR, the
UDF and the PS. This rotation is false, since there are no differences
between the two components of French politics. The Left has long since
abandoned its generous ideas in order to administer the bourse and enjoy
caviar. The Right, on the other hand, without doubt influenced by
the freemasonry that today is a dominant feature in their ranks, has
abandoned the defence of national values in favour of ‘Europe-ism’, ‘globalism’,
and cosmopolitanism. (Le Pen, speech published in Présent,
4 October 1995; quoted in Souchard et al., 1997: 142)
Moreover, the victory of the Left in the 1981 election and in particular
the fact that the PCF participated in the Pierre Mauroy Socialist-led government,
resulted in the Communist Party losing its traditional role of ‘antipolitical-establishment’
party (cf. Bell and Criddle, 1994: 220). The Front
National could thus fill a vacuum and role that nobody else was occupying.
With regard to the second part of the ‘anti-political-establishment strategy’,
it is also important to note that the FN underwent an ideological transformation
during the late 1970s, when many of the old neo-fascist member
groups within the party were expelled or isolated, and the FN got rid of
much of the old political ‘baggage’ of the French extreme Right (Marcus,
1995: 12). This was a necessary step in order to achieve the political legitimacy
required to break the marginalization that had dogged it since its
foundation in 1972.
Finally, other political actors have a considerable impact on whether
a populist party is able to acquire public legitimacy. In this sense, the