Twenty-First Century Populism: The Spectre of Western European ...

204 Twenty-First Century Populism
As mentioned in the introduction, the emergence and success of SF represents
perhaps the most significant impediment to the rise of a new populist
party as it appears to be occupying much of the space which such a challenger
might seek to enter. The populism of SF will be examined in the
second part of the chapter, but here three points are worth mentioning. First
of all, the profile of SF voters in the Republic is similar to those of most
populist parties elsewhere in Western Europe. As Michael Laver (2005: 197)
notes, at the 2002 election, they were predominately young (average age 36),
male (58 per cent) and more likely to be on lower incomes than voters of all
other parties except FF. Moreover, as John Garry (2006) finds, they are more
likely to have low levels of political knowledge, low trust in the existing parties
and a low sense of their political efficacy. Put simply, they are the most
alienated voters in the Republic. Second, it is important to note the financial
and organizational resources of SF which, for a ‘new’ party, are enormous.
Indeed, according to Stephen Collins, it was probably the best-funded party
at the 2002 election, after FF (Collins, 2003: 34). This not only enabled the
party to field candidates in almost every constituency, but also helps pay for
a highly efficient administrative staff, including eight full-time press officers,
covering both sides of the border (Maillot, 2005: 74). A populist party
targeting the urban working-class vote would obviously find it hard to compete
with such a well-oiled and well-funded party machine. Third, and most
important, not only does SF already exploit discontent regarding mainstream
parties, the economy, Irish sovereignty and the EU, but it explicitly
puts itself forward as a ‘clean’, anti-Establishment party which is close to the
common people in local communities. As such, while SF’s support for pluralism
and minority rights disqualify it from membership of the populist
canon, it does articulate much of the discourse which a populist party might
seek to employ.
Finally, we should also note the large (and rising) vote for Independents/
others: 11 per cent in 2002. In particular, Independents have recently done
increasingly well in parts of rural Ireland where former FF and FG voters
have not turned to Labour or the ‘new opposition’, but to local-issue candidates.
Their presence, while pointing to the existence of a dealigned vote in
these areas, is not necessarily encouraging for a populist challenger as it also
indicates the continuing strength of the local and personalized aspects of
election campaigning in Ireland (requiring door-to-door canvassing, high
familiarity with constituency issues and preferably prior county council
experience) which would work against a quick populist breakthrough. As
Gallagher (2003: 101−102) says of Green and SF candidates, so too would it
apply to those of any new party that they ‘cannot expect to be swept into
the Dáil on a national tide; they need to build up a strong local support base
first’. This is essential since, as the 2002 INES showed, 40 per cent of people
voted entirely on the basis of the candidate rather than the party and would
have supported that candidate irrespective of which party he/she represented