Twenty-First Century Populism: The Spectre of Western European ...
Twenty-First Century Populism: The Spectre of Western European ...
Twenty-First Century Populism: The Spectre of Western European ...
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<strong>Populism</strong> and Democracy 23<br />
USA requires closer attention not only because, in the past, there was a<br />
major and dramatic insurgence <strong>of</strong> (agrarian) populism, but also because<br />
other less important, though still significant, instances <strong>of</strong> populism such as<br />
those embodied by Governor and Senator Huey Long, Senator Joseph<br />
McCarthy, Governor George Wallace and presidential candidate Ross Perot,<br />
have punctuated various historical periods and particular geographical<br />
areas (Ware, 2002). Indeed, the US case seems to suggest that the connection<br />
between populism and democracy remains real, strong and inevitable<br />
and that the line separating them is, and continues to be, thin. This line is<br />
bound to be especially thin in mass democracies, which should be carefully<br />
and clearly distinguished from mass societies.<br />
A number <strong>of</strong> American scholars have long been critical <strong>of</strong> the trends<br />
within their society which give rise to a depoliticized mass society (Riesman,<br />
1989), and rightly so, because all mass democracies are dangerously close to<br />
mass societies. Moreover, liberal mass democracies are bound to open up<br />
spaces <strong>of</strong> alienation for isolated individuals whose only escape will <strong>of</strong>ten be<br />
found in what they consider an emotional and direct relationship with a<br />
political leader. In order to clarify this argument, however, we must look at<br />
the social conditions underpinning the opportunities both for the insurgence<br />
<strong>of</strong> populism and for the survival <strong>of</strong> liberal democracy.<br />
Social conditions<br />
<strong>The</strong>re are two different, although closely related, ways to define the social<br />
conditions most conducive to the likely rise <strong>of</strong> populism. <strong>The</strong> first focuses on<br />
individuals and their psycho-sociological characteristics. <strong>The</strong> second concerns<br />
the overall circumstances <strong>of</strong> a specific society. <strong>The</strong> individuals most<br />
likely to be attracted by a populist leader or to be involved in a populist insurgence<br />
share many common features. <strong>The</strong>y are people who become open to a<br />
populist experience because they suffer from political isolation and alienation<br />
and are in serious need <strong>of</strong> emotional attachments, <strong>of</strong> both the vertical<br />
and horizontal type. Social isolation means that they are not connected with<br />
other individuals except through their own personal and material living and<br />
working conditions. Second, and most important, they are usually not members<br />
<strong>of</strong> any kind <strong>of</strong> associations/organizations, be they cultural, religious, or<br />
pr<strong>of</strong>essional. And, if they are, they tend to be passive members. This may be<br />
due to the fact that these individuals have moved from an area in which<br />
traditional ties were sufficient to bind them to other members <strong>of</strong> that community<br />
into one in which new ties are difficult to create. Alternatively, they<br />
may have dropped out <strong>of</strong> a situation in which they had ties (e.g. through<br />
unemployment) and thus find themselves, willingly or unwillingly, unable<br />
to retain any social tie. At this point, these individuals not only find themselves<br />
socially dislocated, but, more specifically, have become ‘available’. This<br />
is the condition, for example, experienced by many unemployed industrial