Twenty-First Century Populism: The Spectre of Western European ...

More documents

Recommendations

Info

The Netherlands 163 LPF members of parliament therefore allowed Herben to conduct negotiations about a government coalition with Christian Democrats and Liberals. Very few in the party preferred the option of opposition. After all, Fortuyn himself had advocated a coalition of the LPF, CDA and VVD − even if he had preferred a ‘business cabinet’ composed of professionals. However, Herben was frequently criticized for his perceived weakness in the negotiation process. Over the summer of 2002, his leadership was questioned by different factions within the parliamentary group and, in August of that year, he resigned. His successor Harry Wijnschenk did nothing to reduce the tensions within the party. On the contrary, by allying himself with a member of the cabinet, he managed to intertwine the conflict within the parliamentary group with already existing tensions between two LPF ministers. Moreover, he antagonized the (provisional) president of the party, the real estate tycoon Ed Maas, accusing him of manipulating the party with real estate interests in mind. No one had the authority to mediate, and the party- in-statu-nascendi lacked the formal/informal rules and institutions to handle conflicts. When the ministers failed to resolve their dispute and refused to resign, the leaders of CDA and VVD decided to end the coalition. On 16 October 2002, the prime minister therefore tendered the resignation of his cabinet to the Queen. When elections were held on 22 January 2003, the LPF obtained 5.7 per cent of the popular vote and lost 18 of its 26 seats (see Table 10.1 above). Grudgingly, the party joined the opposition benches. However, the internal conflicts continued and were followed by further electoral decline. At the 2003 provincial elections, the LPF won only 2.9 per cent of the popular vote and at the 2004 European elections it received just 2.6 per cent − not even enough for a single seat. The parliamentary group finally fell apart in 2005 and when (early) parliamentary elections were held in November 2006, there were three parties laying claim to the legacy of Pim Fortuyn. None of them won any seats. The legacy of the LPF The rapid demise of the Fortuyn movement might suggest that it would not have any great legacy in Dutch politics. Most observers would disagree, however. True, the LPF did not succeed in introducing any institutional reforms and its policy output was rather modest. Nonetheless, directly or indirectly, it contributed to a tougher immigration policy in the Netherlands and a greater emphasis on the integration of immigrants through language courses, naturalization ceremonies and civics exams for marriage partners. Moreover, this issue will remain on the political agenda for the foreseeable future. The LPF also changed the political culture of the Netherlands, for the time being anyway. Accommodation and consensus made way for polarization
164 Twenty-First Century Populism and confrontation, at least by Dutch standards. Personal leadership and an ‘authentic’ personal style have also become more important and new parties are taken more seriously, both by the media and by politicians. When the Dutch Sports Federation and Dutch Olympic Committee elected as president a relative ‘outsider’ rather than the candidate of the Establishment, journalists attributed this to ‘the ghost of Pim’ (Kranenburg, 2003). No doubt the ghost would not be very happy about the impact of his movement, but he need not be too sad either. Conclusion and epilogue With charisma, a liberal-nationalist ideology and an effective media campaign, Pim Fortuyn managed to become the first successful populist leader in the Netherlands. The time was ripe: the pillars had disintegrated and the political elites had lost the loyal support of the masses and neglected salient issues like immigration. Parties had shed their ideological distinctiveness, while the media focused increasingly on colourful personalities and on the failures of the ruling coalition rather than on its successes. However, the rise of Fortuyn’s party came to a swift end after his violent death and posthumous election victory. The LPF failed to resist the consociational temptation to enter government and soon fell victim to internal bickering and mismanagement. Thus, even without pillars, consociationalism prevailed over populism. The fall of Dutch populism with the LPF’s demise may only be temporary, however. At the 2006 general election that sounded the death-knell for the LPF and its successor parties, a new populist party − the Partij voor de Vrijheid (Freedom Party) – won nine seats. Founded by Geert Wilders, a maverick MP who had left the VVD in 2004, the party combines economic liberalism with nationalism and demands for the direct election of public officials. Although, like Fortuyn, Wilders does not refer to the ‘people’ as a morally perfect homogeneous group, he does regard the political class as a homogeneous and nefarious body. Similarly, he advocates cutting taxes and shrinking the civil service (while hiring more policemen and nurses). He also embraces Euroscepticism, arguing that the Netherlands should retain its independence and reduce its contributions to the European Union. Indeed, it should even take the drastic step of leaving the Union in the event of Turkish accession. The party also espouses a hardline position on immigration, arguing for a five-year ban on immigrants from countries like Turkey or Morocco and the denial of welfare and other state benefits for the first ten years of their stay. In fact, in this area, Wilders goes further than Fortuyn by opposing the construction of new mosques. Likewise, he is also more conservative than his populist predecessor with regard to drugs and crime. What Wilders lacks, however, is the sense of humour and charisma which Fortuyn possessed in abundance and only time will tell, therefore, if he and
Page 1 and 2:
Twenty-First Century Populism The S
Page 3 and 4:
This page intentionally left blank
Page 5 and 6:
Editorial matter, selection, introd
Page 7 and 8:
Page 9 and 10:
viii Contents 12 Britain: Imperial
Page 11 and 12:
Acknowledgements The original conce
Page 13 and 14:
xii Notes on Contributors Bollati B
Page 15 and 16:
2 Twenty-First Century Populism pro
Page 17 and 18:
4 Twenty-First Century Populism rig
Page 19 and 20:
6 Twenty-First Century Populism bet
Page 21 and 22:
8 Twenty-First Century Populism be
Page 23 and 24:
10 Twenty-First Century Populism or
Page 25 and 26:
Page 27 and 28:
Page 29 and 30:
16 Twenty-First Century Populism bu
Page 31 and 32:
18 Twenty-First Century Populism el
Page 33 and 34:
20 Twenty-First Century Populism se
Page 35 and 36:
22 Twenty-First Century Populism an
Page 37 and 38:
24 Twenty-First Century Populism wo
Page 39 and 40:
26 Twenty-First Century Populism Am
Page 41 and 42:
28 Twenty-First Century Populism Co
Page 43 and 44:
3 Politics against Democracy: Party
Page 45 and 46:
32 Twenty-First Century Populism su
Page 47 and 48:
34 Twenty-First Century Populism We
Page 49 and 50:
36 Twenty-First Century Populism it
Page 51 and 52:
38 Twenty-First Century Populism Wh
Page 53 and 54:
40 Twenty-First Century Populism th
Page 55 and 56:
42 Twenty-First Century Populism Am
Page 57 and 58:
44 Twenty-First Century Populism ov
Page 59 and 60:
Page 61 and 62:
Page 63 and 64:
Page 65 and 66:
52 Twenty-First Century Populism A
Page 67 and 68:
54 Twenty-First Century Populism po
Page 69 and 70:
56 Twenty-First Century Populism 3.
Page 71 and 72:
58 Twenty-First Century Populism pr
Page 73 and 74:
60 Twenty-First Century Populism In
Page 75 and 76:
Page 77 and 78:
64 Twenty-First Century Populism it
Page 79 and 80:
Page 81 and 82:
68 Twenty-First Century Populism em
Page 83 and 84:
70 Twenty-First Century Populism As
Page 85 and 86:
72 Twenty-First Century Populism Ge
Page 87 and 88:
74 Twenty-First Century Populism co
Page 89 and 90:
76 Twenty-First Century Populism un
Page 91 and 92:
78 Twenty-First Century Populism br
Page 93 and 94:
Page 95 and 96:
82 Twenty-First Century Populism ob
Page 97 and 98:
6 Italy: A Country of Many Populism
Page 99 and 100:
86 Twenty-First Century Populism ha
Page 101 and 102:
88 Twenty-First Century Populism an
Page 103 and 104:
90 Twenty-First Century Populism of
Page 105 and 106:
92 Twenty-First Century Populism pe
Page 107 and 108:
94 Twenty-First Century Populism Th
Page 109 and 110:
96 Twenty-First Century Populism Re
Page 111 and 112:
Page 113 and 114:
7 Switzerland: Yet Another Populist
Page 115 and 116:
102 Twenty-First Century Populism s
Page 117 and 118:
104 Twenty-First Century Populism T
Page 119 and 120:
106 Twenty-First Century Populism S
Page 121 and 122:
108 Twenty-First Century Populism r
Page 123 and 124:
110 Twenty-First Century Populism h
Page 125 and 126: 112 Twenty-First Century Populism a
Page 127 and 128: 114 Twenty-First Century Populism t
Page 129 and 130: 116 Twenty-First Century Populism o
Page 131 and 132: 118 Twenty-First Century Populism d
Page 133 and 134: 120 Twenty-First Century Populism i
Page 137 and 138: 124 Twenty-First Century Populism F
Page 139 and 140: 126 Twenty-First Century Populism T
Page 141 and 142: 128 Twenty-First Century Populism s
Page 143 and 144: 130 Twenty-First Century Populism n
Page 147 and 148: 134 Twenty-First Century Populism l
Page 149 and 150: 136 Twenty-First Century Populism s
Page 155 and 156: 142 Twenty-First Century Populism b
Page 157 and 158: 144 Twenty-First Century Populism W
Page 163 and 164: 150 Twenty-First Century Populism o
Page 165 and 166: 152 Twenty-First Century Populism p
Page 167 and 168: 154 Twenty-First Century Populism S
Page 169 and 170: 156 Twenty-First Century Populism A
Page 171 and 172: 158 Twenty-First Century Populism h
Page 173 and 174: 160 Twenty-First Century Populism u
Page 175: 162 Twenty-First Century Populism t
Page 179 and 180: 11 France: The FRONT NATIONAL, Ethn
Page 183 and 184: 170 Twenty-First Century Populism S
Page 189 and 190: 176 Twenty-First Century Populism v
Page 195 and 196: 182 Twenty-First Century Populism w
Page 199 and 200: 186 Twenty-First Century Populism 9
Page 203 and 204: 190 Twenty-First Century Populism L
Page 205 and 206: 192 Twenty-First Century Populism f
Page 207 and 208: 194 Twenty-First Century Populism e
Page 211 and 212: 13 The Republic of Ireland: The Dog
Page 213 and 214: 200 Twenty-First Century Populism f
Page 217 and 218: 204 Twenty-First Century Populism A
Page 219 and 220: 206 Twenty-First Century Populism l
Page 221 and 222: 208 Twenty-First Century Populism m
Page 225 and 226: 212 Twenty-First Century Populism c
Page 227 and 228:
214 Twenty-First Century Populism c
Page 229 and 230:
216 Twenty-First Century Populism f
Page 231 and 232:
218 Twenty-First Century Populism i
Page 233 and 234:
220 Twenty-First Century Populism P
Page 235 and 236:
222 Twenty-First Century Populism e
Page 237 and 238:
Bibliography Akkerman, T. Anti-immi
Page 239 and 240:
226 Bibliography BNP (2005) Rebuild
Page 241 and 242:
228 Bibliography Dahl, R. A. (1999)
Page 243 and 244:
230 Bibliography Germani, G. (1975)
Page 245 and 246:
232 Bibliography Ivaldi, G. Le Fron
Page 247 and 248:
234 Bibliography Lehingue, P. (2003
Page 249 and 250:
236 Bibliography Mazzoleni, G. (200
Page 251 and 252:
238 Bibliography Pelinka, A. (2005)
Page 253 and 254:
240 Bibliography Schedler, A. Anti-
Page 255 and 256:
242 Bibliography Trechsel, A. H. (2
Page 257 and 258:
Page 259 and 260:
246 Index Chirac, Jacques 58, 168,
Page 261 and 262:
248 Index Jagers, Jan 58 Jansson, M
Page 263 and 264:
250 Index Plato 200 Poland 62, 120
show all

Twenty-First Century Populism: The Spectre of Western European ...

You also want an ePaper? Increase the reach of your titles

Delete template?

Save as template?