Twenty-First Century Populism: The Spectre of Western European ...

70 Twenty-First Century Populism
As a latecomer to the Austrian political scene in 1955, the FPÖ thus stood
outside the consociational framework and was well-positioned to condemn
its excesses and convincingly call for its dismantling.
Value shifts and demographic change
After the Second World War, Austria initially maintained the closed ideological
camps that had existed in the First Republic (1918−38). Several decades
later, in the late 1960s and early 1970s, the country entered a period of
structural political dealignment encompassing increased electoral volatility
and a gradual breakdown of the closed ideological milieus. Greater interparty
competition − the SPÖ was in opposition from 1966 to 1970 − and
subsequent social and political reforms undertaken by the Social Democratic
majority government under Chancellor Bruno Kreisky restabilized the political
system until the late 1970s. However, the prosperity of that decade
helped shift the political weight to the (new) middle-class, which embraced
a new liberal renaissance, valuing individual choice and personal advancement.
From the late 1970s to the mid-1980s, Austrian politics entered a
period of ‘affective dealignment’ which saw growing alienation from traditional
politics. The increase in scepticism vis-à-vis the state as an agent of
progress was mirrored by emerging post-materialist value orientations and a
corresponding desire for alternative political choices (Plasser et al., 2000;
Heinisch, 2002). This phase was followed by a third period in the late 1980s
and early 1990s, characterized by an increasing protest-orientation. A string
of political scandals and numerous cases of influence peddling that had
surfaced in the 1980s deepened the disillusionment with the political elites
(Pelinka, 1996). The emerging culture of protest was thus defined by strong
alienation from (and hostility to) those in power (Systemverdrossenheit)
(Plasser and Ulram, 1996: 394). Some 47 per cent of Austrians therefore preferred
‘new parties in the political arena’ whereas only 10 per cent had supported
this idea a decade earlier (Ulram, 1994: 92).
The shift away from the traditional parties increased to the extent that
they could no longer guarantee the economic benefits and social protection
of previous times. Growing fiscal constraints and international competitive
pressure reduced the economic policy space of the government. The perceived
decline in social competence was a problem in particular for the
Social Democrats, as we can clearly see from polls conducted during that
period (cf. Ulram, 1994: 95). Moreover, the SPÖ was also perceived as increasingly
technocratic, with the result that the percentage of people feeling that
the Social Democrats represented ‘ordinary people’ dropped from 57 per
cent to 42 per cent (Ulram, 1994, esp. Table 3.1).
Summing up, as a system of ultra stability, the Austrian model found it
difficult to react to change. The ensuing crisis of legitimacy therefore
presented considerable opportunities for new political parties outside the