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Between Two Worlds Kafadar.pdf

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there was no reason to assume that it would be accomplished by the Ottomans. Why<br />

were they able to harness the frontier dynamism and the gaza ethos, as well as<br />

the mixed cultural heritage they all shared to some extent, more successfully<br />

than the rival polities? Or rather, what were the factors that enabled the<br />

Ottomans to eventually do better than the other statelings and even the Seljuk<br />

state?<br />

Insofar as the gaza ethos played a role, it must be remembered that the Ottomans<br />

were not the only ones who could claim to be fighting in the path of God. A<br />

similar Point can be made about "tribalism" or any other notion, concept, ethos,<br />

principle, ideology, or institution that one can neither show nor logically<br />

expect to be uniquely Ottoman. In other words, the investigation of the rise of<br />

Ottoman Power must always proceed comparatively.<br />

Furthermore, the question must be continually reformulated with respect to the<br />

different stages in the development of Ottoman power.<br />

― 120 ―<br />

The empire was not built by 1337, the year the Bursa inscription went up, which<br />

has been pegged as marking the supersession of tribalism by the gaza ideology.<br />

Even if a phenomenon like inclusivist tribalism looms large in the earliest<br />

Ottoman success, how are we to explain the rest of Ottoman state building? The<br />

question of the "cause(s) of Ottoman success" cannot be expected to yield a<br />

unitary answer for the whole period one needs to consider. It must be raised and<br />

reraised in, say, 1300 or 1330 or 1360 or 1410. The answers in each case might<br />

differ, at least in terms of the emphases one needs to place on different<br />

factors.<br />

An ideological commitment to gaza was in all likelihood common to all these<br />

periods, but its character and intensity kept changing, just as inclusivism was<br />

never fully abandoned by the Ottomans but was constantly redefined. It may be<br />

more significant that in all these phases there were warriors who wanted to see<br />

and present themselves as representatives of that ideological complex of<br />

heroism, honor, and striving in the name of Islam. As we shall analyze in this<br />

chapter, however, their standing within the principality and their relationship<br />

to the House of Osman also kept changing, as did those of other social forces<br />

like the dervishes. The social and political configuration as a whole kept<br />

changing while power, shared and contested in varying degrees at any given<br />

moment, was gradually concentrated in the hands of an administration serving a<br />

dynasty. This chapter will focus on the general dynamics of that change and its<br />

important phases in order to understand the rise of the Ottoman state as a<br />

process rather than as a mechanical relationship between a particular cause and<br />

an outcome.<br />

Many scholars have noted that the location of Osman's beglik provided it with a<br />

unique advantage, which will be reconsidered below, in the earlier stages of its<br />

development. But it was not just a matter of the circumstances in which the<br />

Ottomans happened to find themselves. They also acted upon those circumstances<br />

in certain ways and forged their destiny. In this respect, the Ottoman practice<br />

of unigeniture, for instance — of keeping their territories intact in each<br />

succession under the full control of a single heir — stands out as a significant<br />

106

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