Between Two Worlds Kafadar.pdf

instance, Herman Leibovics, True France: The Wars over Cultural Identity,
1900-1945 (Cambridge, Mass., 1993). In fact, it is not always possible to
distinguish ethnic and cultural diversity; the term "ethnic" is only awkwardly
applied to prenational societies. On national history as linear narrative, see
Homi K. Bhabha, ed., Nation and Narration (London and New York, 1990).
21. Though this is not the place to discuss this issue in detail, I should note
that some of my comments here are based on the observation that the history of
most of the world seems to be written in two spheres, the national and the
international, that do not always communicate well with each other. Individual
historians may in fact produce different kinds of histories for these different
spheres. At any rate, for the history of many nations there are two different
consensuses, if not more. Only some non-Western nations have had their national
version internationally recognized, even then with many differences. Besides,
for every nationalist proposition that achieves international recognition,
objections are bound to be raised by "hostile" nationalist traditions. Hence,
there is never full international recognition, but if scholars and institutions
of the Western world accept a proposition, that proposition becomes the
dominant, thus "international," position at large.
22. The process of Islamization, which implied Turkification over the long run
in Anatolia and, to a lesser extent, in the Balkans, must naturally be studied
against the background of migrations and conversions. On both of those issues,
we lack statistical information, which is a serious obstacle to dealing (if this
is at all desirable) with the numerical dimensions of the ethnoreligious
concoction. Some have tried nonetheless. Osman Turan estimates that since
Turkish immigration was constant and conversion to Islam was not mandatory,
ethnic Turks out-numbered Islamized Christians in a ratio of 70:30. See his
"L'islamisation dans la Turquie du moyen âge," SI 10 (1959):137-52, where these
numbers are not even tentatively substantiated. Mükrimin Halil Yinanç provides
another daring estimate that there were more than 1,080,000 Türkmen tribesfolk
in Asia Minor at the end of the thirteenth century on the basis of highly
dubious, general figures given in medieval narrative sources. See his Türkiye
Tarihi Selçuklular Devri, vol. 1, Anadolu'nun Fethi (Istanbul, 1944), 174-76.
For a serious study at the micro level, see H. Lowry, Trabzon Sehrinin *
Islamlasma * ve Turklesmesi * , 1461-1583 (Istanbul, [1981?]). Recent
developments in genetic research have facilitated the return of racially
oriented investigation and may, alas, address the issue at hand.
23. For a discussion of the main differences of opinion, see N. Todorov, The
Balkan City, 1400-1900 (Seattle, 1983), 13 ff., who portrays the generally
accepted (non-Turkish) view as follows:
[T]he destructive force of invasion turned numerous areas of the Balkans into a
desert for a prolonged period, and ... the local population, routed by the
invader, exterminated and taken into slavery, declined to the extent that all
the more fertile plains became populated by the Turks.
On the Turkish side, see, for instance, M. Akdag * , Türkiye'nin Iktisadi * ve
Ictimai * Tarihi, 2 vols. (Istanbul, 1974):
It is dear from both Byzantine and Turkish sources that Turks and the people of
Byzantium intermingled with no animosity of either religious or national nature,
and procured their mutual needs from one another. (1:463)
Anatolian Christians, who suffered much poverty under Byzantine rule and on the
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