Between Two Worlds Kafadar.pdf
Between Two Worlds Kafadar.pdf
Between Two Worlds Kafadar.pdf
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Insofar as the gaza ethos is concerned, we have seen in the last chapter that it<br />
was intimately tied to a code of honor. Old camaraderies, favors, promises, and<br />
bonds carried a certain weight. Surely they could be broken, but the breaking of<br />
bonds needed to be given meaning within that code. The supporters of Osman<br />
preferred to tell the story of Osman's attack on the tekvur of Bilecik, his<br />
former ally, as something that occurred only after Osman had heard that the<br />
tekvur was about to play a trick on him. On the other hand, there is no reason<br />
to expect that some of those friendships did not continue. Alexios<br />
Philanthropenos was so<br />
― 127 ―<br />
respected by the Turks that they were willing to drop the 1323 siege of<br />
Philadelphia "remembering the kindness and valor he had displayed in 1295."[17]<br />
The most-acclaimed warriors of such frontier conditions have always been those<br />
who could, while upholding their own cause with courage and determination,<br />
display statesmanly compassion and magnanimity toward the enemy. Salah al-Din<br />
al-Ayyubi (Saladin) is probably the best-known example of a medieval warrior who<br />
elegantly combined these two, seemingly contradictory, qualities.[18]<br />
As neighborly or chivalric as Osman's relations with other Bithynians may have<br />
been, some of those relations eventually turned sour as he set out to expand his<br />
domain. Maybe some tension was always inherent in such relationships, not just<br />
between Muslim and Christian but also between coreligionists. Different pieces<br />
of the Bithynian puzzle may well have been living with an awareness of the<br />
temporary nature of the post-Lascarid arrangement. The conversation that leads<br />
to Osman's argument against his brothers suggestion of burning and destroying<br />
starts with Osman's question as to the best methods of gathering soldiers and<br />
conquering lands. At least one of those neighbors was to become a permanent<br />
addition to Osman's political community, however. Mihal , the headman of the<br />
village of Harmankaya, apparently joined Osman's exploits quite early in the<br />
latter's career.[19] It is not dear when he converted to Islam, but some sources<br />
write of the resentment felt by some gazis of this "infidel" among them who had<br />
been participating in and apparently enjoying the benefits of their raids. While<br />
this may seem odd to some modern scholars, we have seen in the last chapter that<br />
even the canonical sources on "war for the faith" did not dismiss such<br />
cooperation offhand. In any case, Mihal did convert after a point, and his<br />
descendants, known as the Sons of Mihal or the House of Mihal (Mihalogullari or<br />
Al-i Mihal ), enjoyed the foremost rank among the gazis in Ottoman service,<br />
though their relationship to the House of Osman was not always free of tension.<br />
It has been pointed out that Osman's relation to Mihal , from a relatively equal<br />
partnership to vassalage to full incorporation in a new hierarchical structure,<br />
can be seen as the beginning of a particularly noteworthy pattern in "Ottoman<br />
methods of conquest."[20]<br />
The picture of Osman's rivals would be incomplete without considering another<br />
"ethnic group" in post-Mongol Anatolia. Although some of them eventually became<br />
assimilated (or some left for central Asia with Timur after 1402), certain<br />
people called Tatar are distinguished from the Türkmen of the ucat and appear as<br />
foes of the Ottomans. These seem to be the non-Oguz Turks and Mongols who were,<br />
112