Between Two Worlds Kafadar.pdf

exaggerated, however. In fact, the nature of the interest shown by
Constantinople once again underscores the advantageous position of
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Osman's chiefdom. Michael Palaeologus devoted some attention to the region in
1280-81: in addition to leading an expedition there, he repaired some
fortresses, built new ones, and took measures to render the banks of the
Sangarius inaccessible to the Turkish forces that had to cross the river to raid
Bithynian settlements. Andronicus II spent nearly three years there between 1290
and 1293. These efforts were not in vain in terms of blocking Turkish attacks in
the area that had been the most vulnerable, namely, directly to the west of the
Sangarius. The area around Tarsius (Tersiye/Terzi Yeri), which lay along the
favorite invasion route over the bridge of Justinian, had witnessed the most
intense raider action in the immediate post-Lascarid era. Had this situation
continued, a chieftaincy based in Paphlagonia could have gained the upper hand.
The Byzantine fortifications were eventually captured, of course, but not from
across the river. To that extent, imperial policies had been successful. The
Ottomans, based as they were in a more southerly, and originally less prominent,
location compared to the forces of Paphlagonia, moved "along the river from the
south, rendering the fortresses obsolete."[39]
The initial Ottoman move up along the river and westward into Bithynia occurred
in the few years following the Battle of Bapheus when they started to make a
name for themselves outside the area and to attract aspiring warriors. Only with
hindsight does that expansion seem so crucial. In the first two decades of the
fourteenth century, looking at western Anatolian frontiers overall, the scene of
action in the Aegean area must have been much more glamorous, especially since
Ottoman encroachments into Byzantine territory apparently suffered a lull
between 1307 and 1307.[40] No matter what the Ottomans had achieved in the first
decades of the fourteenth century, they could not yet measure up to the emirates
of Aydin and Mentese . And no matter how many warriors, dervishes, and scholars
Osman attracted to his growing community, some of the other begliks did better.
According to figures provided by al-`Umari , which must be based on the
realities of the 1320s, there were begliks that could muster larger forces than
could the House of Osman. Already by 1312, the House of Aydin had built an
architectural complex centered on an Ulu Cami, a cathedral mosque, indicating
lofty claims and abundant funds on a scale that the Ottomans were unable to
match until the 1330s.[41]
To the extent that the presence of the begliks was a constant challenge to the
Byzantine Empire, it would take no more than a few decades for the Ottoman one
to emerge as the main thrust of that challenge. In his
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depiction of the principalities in the frontiers of western Anatolia, the Arab
geographer al-`Umari would single out the Ottomans as constantly engaged in
warfare with Byzantium and often the effective side. When Ibn Battuta toured the
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