Between Two Worlds Kafadar.pdf

successive cases of unigeniture as merely a series of flukes. Besides, Mehmed
Çelebi seems to have done his historical homework in arguing that the Ottomans
did not seem to have ever taken warmly to the idea of sharing; Orhan's brotherly
suggestion to Ala'eddin is reported to have been not that they share the realm
but that the latter be the "shepherd." In each generation, this reluctance to
divide the realm manifested itself: with Murad I (r. 1362-89) and Bayezid I (r.
1389-1402) both decisively eliminating the challenges raised by their brothers
and/or sons; with none of the princes during the Interregnum (1402-13) pursuing
any other goal than seizing control over an undivided realm; with Murad II (r.
1421-51) again having to deal with contenders from the family in an all-out
struggle; and with Mehmed II (r. 1451-81) finally legislating fratricide as the
culmination of a centralist logic whose goal was to eliminate all tendencies
toward fragmentation. The struggle between Mehmed II's sons led to Prince Cem's
unusual suggestion of sharing the realm, but by then he had lost the struggle
and his brother would have none of it. Looking at Ottoman succession practices
over the long run, it is dear that they continued, until the seventeenth
century, the Inner Asian tradition of giving each heir a sphere of influence
within the family dominions and a chance for future rulership, but adapted that
tradition
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to their own vision of a strong central government. An appanage was no more than
a princely fief; once one of the princes reached the throne to replace their
father, the others would be dispossessed and, after Orhan at least, eliminated.
No "net-eponymous" dynasty emerged out of Osman's clan. Over the long run, the
Ottomans proved to be better students of history than their competitors, not
just in the policy of succession but also in the way they dealt with other real
and potential challenges to centralization of power, as we shall see next.
Into the Limelight and the Rise of Tensions
If the Ottomans had grown relatively removed from the limelight of
"international politics," they found the opportunity to catch up when Byzantine
factionalism pulled them into a wider orbit and took them across the Sea of
Marmara into Thrace. Among the Turco-Muslim principalities of western Anatolia,
it was the House of Aydin whose support was first sought by Kantakouzenos, one
of the main contenders to the imperial title. Eventually, two other
principalities, flanking the southern side of the Sea of Marmara, became deeply
involved in the factional strife of the empire. These were the chiefdom of Orhan
to the southeast and that of the Karasi to the southwest of Marmara facing
Thrace.
Very little is known about the history of the Karasi emirate.[49] The Ottoman
chronicles are particularly muddled in those sections that cover the relations
between these two neighboring rivals. One thing is certain, however, and of
major significance for early Ottoman history: the Karasi had a group of
particularly accomplished and renowned warriors who could teach the Ottomans a
thing or two about crossing over into Thrace, which presented premium raiding
territory. Once Orhan eliminated the House of Karasi and annexed its realm,
those warriors passed into his service and provided valuable military leadership
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