convergence

The Geography of Badness
tained examination to date of the geography of illicit transnational activity—“the relationship
between state fragility and cross-border criminality is variable and complicated.” 24
A multitude of different factors will influence whether or not a given corner of the globe
becomes a magnet for criminality, and the strength or weakness of the state in question is
just one variable in a highly dynamic situation. Indeed, so many factors influence the level
of cross-border criminality in a given country or region that the exercise of classifying the
relevant vectors may degenerate into something akin to Justice Potter Stewart’s test for identifying
pornography: I know an illicit economic hub when I see one. Consider the description
of post-Soviet Ukraine’s emergence as a black market hub from former Deputy Assistant
Secretary of State Jonathan Winer: “There’s concentrated power, resources in very few hands,
no oversight, no separate functioning judiciary, a huge porous border, huge inherited military
facilities, lots of airstrips, a bunch of old planes.” What made Ukraine so attractive to underworld
elements, in Winer’s view, was its role as “a one-stop shopping infrastructure for anyone
who wants to buy anything.” 25 He also notes the concentration of power—a feature that is not
associated with the kind of state failure that often characterizes terrorist safe havens. Winer
memorably characterized Ukraine as “the epicenter of global badness,” and the country remains
a major venue for numerous forms of illicit activity. In seeking to identify other critical locales
in the illicit global economy, it should be possible to make some general observations about
the characteristic features of a criminal hub.
Hallmarks of a Criminal Hub
In 2003, the Library of Congress published a study called Nations Hospitable to Organized
Crime and Terrorism. The study feels somewhat dated today; it was a product of the immediate
aftermath of the attacks of 9/11, perhaps not the most conducive environment for a sober
assessment of the relevant threats. But it provides a thoughtful examination of some of the
general characteristics that might render a country appealing to professional criminals:
The main domestic elements making a nation “hospitable” to transnational crime and
terrorism are official corruption, incomplete or weak legislation, poor enforcement of
existing laws, non-transparent financial institutions, unfavorable economic conditions,
lack of respect for the rule of law in society, and poorly guarded national borders. . . .
Such purely domestic factors often are exacerbated by a nation’s geographic location
(along a key narcotics trafficking route or in a region where arms trafficking is prolific,
for example) or the influence of regional geopolitical issues such as a long-standing
territorial dispute. 26
Notwithstanding the fact that the study has unhelpfully conflated terrorism and crime,
this list of variables is a useful starting point, which I would adapt somewhat to comprise the
items below. My own list is hardly meant to be exhaustive. Rather, it is a provisional effort to
explore how these dynamics affect transnational crime in particular, which will, I hope, suggest
some avenues for future research.
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