convergence

Wechsler and Barnabo
enemies in Afghanistan. The Interagency Operations Coordination Center, a joint U.S. –
United Kingdom center that provides law enforcement targeting support and operational
coordination for counternarcotics and counter–illicit networks operations in Afghanistan, is
a broader example of successful whole-of-government initiatives to counter organized crime
that also include the participation of key U.S. allies.
The Department of Defense has also adapted its policies in Afghanistan to address the
convergence of crime and insurgency more effectively. In 2008, DOD changed its policy to enable
U.S. forces to provide direct support to counternarcotics missions conducted by the DEA
and its Afghan counterparts. This shift in policy has led to a number of successful operations,
such as Khafa Khardan, during which U.S. and coalition forces operating under the International
Security Assistance Force enabled 94 counterdrug operations by Afghan counterdrug
law enforcement units and their mentors in a 30-day period.
DOD possesses significant convening power outside of Afghanistan. Through organizations
such as the Joint Interagency Task Force–South ( JIATF-S) and JIATF-W, DOD
has brought key U.S. agencies together in pursuit of common objectives. These hubs of collaboration
facilitate fast and flexible responses to the range of threats posed by transnational
organized crime. They are prime examples of the government assuming the characteristics
of a network—essentially creating a network among myriad U.S. Government agencies in
one location—to combat a networked threat. While its traditional emphasis has been on
counternarcotics, particularly the interdiction of illegal drugs, JIATF-S is a resounding success.
In 2009, it accounted for more than 40 percent of global cocaine interdiction, and in the
past two decades it has deprived criminal organizations of nearly $200 billion in profits. 7 Its
success stems in large part from the long-term, sustained, and institutionalized integration
of effort among law enforcement, DOD, and intelligence. Indeed, it may be that DOD’s role
in establishing the institutional architecture that enables agencies to work together as part of
a unified, whole-of-government approach is actually the most significant contribution it has
made in the fight against transnational organized crime and related national security threats.
Entities such as the JIATFs are not easy to create, and success does not stem from standing
up an organization, calling it “joint,” and staffing it from across the interagency. Impact and
sustainability require a set of conditions, beginning with a clear overlap in vital interests so
that stakeholders see the value of enduring participation, and a shared commitment to unified
action around the issues affecting those interests. Next, it is critical to develop and implement
strong cross-organizational structures that bring order and discipline to execution of critical
tasks. Finally, the organization must be adaptive, adjusting its approaches based on evolutions,
transformations, and shocks to the “issue set” it is chartered to address. DOD leadership has
fostered these conditions in the JIATFs, turning them into highly effective interagency hubs
that are models for replication.
New Challenges and Paradigms of Support
Five years ago, the Mexican government directed its military to increase its traditional role
of supporting law enforcement while Mexico undertook reforms to strengthen police, the
judicial system, and related institutions. These measures were largely necessitated by Mexican
transnational criminal organizations’ diversification beyond drug trafficking into kidnapping,
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