convergence

Miklaucic and Naím
linkages to external illicit networks proliferate. When this penetration becomes pervasive and
affects critical nodes of decisionmaking, it becomes an advanced pathology of dysfunctional
governance characterized by the presence of criminals and criminal agents in positions of
state authority where they facilitate and implement criminal activities for the illicit networks
for which they ultimately work, thus undermining the pillars of government legitimacy and
functionality. We describe “Criminal capture” as the condition of dysfunctional governance in
which criminal agents are so sufficiently prominent in positions of state authority that their
criminal actions cannot effectively be restrained by the state. At some point, it may become
part of state or substate institutional doctrine to engage in illicit activity. At this level, the
state is not only subverted by illicit elements but is directly complicit in those activities and
endorses those activities. Pervasive institutionalization defines the fully “Criminal sovereign,”
which functions effectively as a criminal enterprise with the apparatus of the state itself engaged
directly in criminal activity as a matter of policy. Such a state exists outside the realm of
the family of states, which is governed if only nominally by the international law regime and
associated norms. Such a state is a threat to all other states, to the international rule-based
system of states, and to the contemporary structure of global order. To animate this spectrum,
we discuss examples of the various stages along the spectrum.
Conceptual Challenges
Networks of criminals, smugglers, counterfeiters, insurgents, and terrorists are not a new
phenomenon. Indeed, such networks have operated on the criminal fringe of communities
in all societies and at all times. These vocations are surely among the oldest professions. Yet
our understanding of the operations and structures of the organizations that dominate these
trades is woefully inadequate. In this field, we are at a very primitive level of conceptual development.
Indeed, we are only beginning to know what we need to understand. There is a
crippling shortage of reliable data regarding the operations and structures of illicit networks.
When data are available, we lack tested and proven tools to interpret them. This does not refer
to technically advanced computer models, but to the absence of the fundamental conceptual
models required for a disciplined analytic approach. Even concepts as basic as “licit” and “illicit”
remain contested. A basic and widely accepted taxonomy of the objects of study—illicit networks
and organizations—is lacking.
This conceptual underdevelopment has many causes, but professional, bureaucratic,
and international fragmentation are important sources of confusion and poor analysis when
studying transnational illicit networks. Sociologists perceive the phenomena from the vantage
point of intellectual frameworks and models emerging from their discipline, emphasizing the
dynamics of collective human behavior. Criminologists are prone to view transnational criminal
networks as an extension of individual criminality, best addressed within a law enforcement
framework. Anthropologists, political scientists, and international relations specialists all
perceive the phenomenon through the lenses of their disciplines; none owns it, yet none can
dismiss it. This leads inevitably to conceptual confusion, competing models, and interdisciplinary
competition for the right to claim the correct or best analysis.
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