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How Illicit Networks Impact Sovereignty<br />

40 Alfredo Corchado, “Drug cartels taking over government roles in parts of Mexico,” Vancouver Sun, May 4, 2011.<br />

41 Ibid.<br />

42 Alma Guillermoprieto, “The Narcovirus,” Berkeley Review of Latin American Studies, Spring 2009, 3–9,<br />

available at . Also see Alma<br />

Guillermoprieto, “Days of the Dead: The New Narcocultura,” The New Yorker, November 10, 2008, available at<br />

.<br />

43 Pamela L. Bunker and Robert J. Bunker, “The Spiritual Significance of ¿Plata O Plomo?” Small Wars Journal,<br />

May 27, 2010, available at .<br />

44 See Eric Hobsbawn, Bandits (New York: The New Press, 2000).<br />

45 See John P. Sullivan, “Policing Networked Diasporas,” Small Wars Journal, July 9, 2007, available at .<br />

46 See John P. Sullivan and Adam Elkus, “Border zones and insecurity in the Americas,” openDemocracy.<br />

net, November 24, 2009, available at .<br />

47 See Ivan Briscoe, “Trouble on the Borders: Latin America’s New Conflict Zones,” Madrid: FRIDE, July 2008,<br />

available at .<br />

48 Sullivan and Elkus, “Border zones and insecurity in the Americas.”<br />

49 Border zones are potential incubators of conflict. Criminal gangs exploit weak state presence to forge a parallel<br />

state and prosecute their criminal enterprises sustained by fear, violence, and brutality. See Sullivan and Elkus,<br />

“Border zones and insecurity in the Americas.”<br />

50 The Institutional Revolutionary Party (known as the PRI in Spanish) traditionally set all power boundaries in<br />

Mexican political and economic life, both legal and illicit. That changed with the implementation of a true multiparty<br />

state. The criminal mafias exploited that new power-generating opportunity. See Nik Steinberg, “The Monster and Monterrey:<br />

The Politics and Cartels of Mexico’s Drug War,” The Nation, May 25, 2011, available at .<br />

51 See Max G. Manwaring, “Sovereignty Under Siege: Gangs and other Criminal Organizations in Central<br />

America and Mexico,” Air & Space Power Journal—Spanish Edition, July 1, 2008, available at .<br />

52 Michoacán was an early example of emerging cartel political action. In that state, La Familia forged a parallel<br />

government generating employment, keeping order, providing social and civic goods, collecting (street) taxes, and<br />

co-opting legitimate governmental administrative and security functions. See George W. Grayson, La Familia Drug<br />

Cartel: Implications for U.S.-Mexican Security (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, Strategic Studies<br />

Institute, December 2010). Los Zetas started providing similar social goods in 2010–2011, leading the author to<br />

observe that they were acting as “accidental insurgents.”<br />

53 See Shawn Teresa Flanigan, “Violent Providers: Comparing Public Service Provision by Middle Eastern<br />

Insurgent Organizations and Mexican Drug Cartels,” 52nd Annual ISA Convention.<br />

54 John P. Sullivan and Adam Elkus, “Mexico’s Criminal Insurgency,” Defense and the National Interest and<br />

Small Wars Journal, November 9, 2008, available at .<br />

55 Philip Bobbitt, The Shield of Achilles: War, Peace and the Course of History (New York: Knopf, 2002); and<br />

Philip Bobbitt, Terror and Consent: The Wars for the Twenty-First Century (New York: Knopf, 2008).<br />

56 David Ronfeldt and Danielle Varda, “The Prospects for Cyberocracy (Revisited),” Social Science Research<br />

Network, December 1, 2008, available at .<br />

57 See John P. Sullivan and Adam Elkus, “Security in the network-state,” openDemocracy.net, October 6, 2009,<br />

available at .<br />

58 See Saskia Sassen, “The new executive politics: a democratic challenge,” openDemocracy.net, June 28, 2009,<br />

available at ; and Sullivan<br />

and Elkus, “Security in the network-state.”<br />

59 Saskia Sassen, “Neither global nor national: novel assemblages of territory, authority and rights,” Ethics &<br />

Global Politics 1, no. 1–2 (2008), 61.<br />

60 Gary King and Langche Zeng, “Improving Forecasts of State failure,” World Politics 53 (July 2001), 623–658.<br />

61 John P. Sullivan, “Fusing Terrorism Security and Response,” in Countering Terrorism and WMD: Creating<br />

a Global Counter-terrorism Network, ed. Peter Katona, Michael D. Intriligator, and John P. Sullivan, 272–288<br />

(London: Routledge, 2006).<br />

187

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