convergence

Introduction
organizations have adopted the techniques of terrorist violence—sometimes referred to as
the “propaganda of the deed”—as a central element in their strategic communication plans
and a way of intimidating their rivals. In the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam we see the
convergence of crime, terror, and insurgency into a potent set of capabilities—drawing from
and contributing to the toolkits of each of the three species of illicit organization—that is
particularly toxic if not unique. The conventional view that mutual disincentives discourage
terrorists from associating with transnational criminal networks, and vice versa, appears to
be an artifact of a bygone era.
The illicit economy operates in the shadows of the legal and official political economy.
In order to understand the scope of the problem, both scholars and practitioners must develop
credible estimates of the size of the illicit economy using accessible data sets, sound
methodologies, and transparent assumptions. Otherwise, it is hardly possible to support any
argument concerning the size, nature, and growth of illicit networks and markets. Estimates
of the magnitude of the phenomena we call transnational organized crime range from 1 to 15
percent of global product. Justin Picard attempts to sharpen the analytic tools for developing
meaningful metrics in this otherwise occluded space. It is also necessary to estimate the degree
of harm caused by illicit markets. One must establish a relationship between illicit activities
and the actual harm they cause to society in order to understand and counter the threat they
pose. This cannot be done without collaboration among experts on illicit markets, economists,
criminologists, environmentalists, diplomats, political scientists, and public health specialists,
among others.
Illicit commerce affects numerous industries from banking, finance, information technology,
real estate, telecommunications, transport, and import/export to industries many do
not often think of including entertainment, music, film, textiles, and luxury goods. By some
estimates, transnational criminal organizations are attaining the same high levels of revenue
as Fortune 500 companies. These organizations invest in the licit economy—through real
estate, businesses, and other entities—as both a means to launder money and a way to gain
legitimate revenue, thereby creating a “gray economy” in which legality is sometimes difficult
to distinguish from illegality. With skilled lawyers, financiers, and accountants, illicit networks
are able to launder their profits and effectively generate further income, often from strictly
legal activity, thus drawing many more players—sometimes unknowingly—into the domain
of illicit activity. Phil Williams puts these developments in the context of a range of disturbing
“mega-trends” that he argues will lead to a future of lawlessness and disorder.
Complex Illicit Operations
How do illicit networks operate? What are their interrelationships? What are their logistical
challenges and responses? What is their tradecraft? As long as there is a market for illicit
products, illicit supply chains will thrive and provide a supply to meet the demand. Duncan
Deville describes the various agents manning these supply chains, their functional roles, and
their extraordinary creativity in adapting to any attempt to curtail their efforts. When joint
Colombian and international law enforcement efforts succeeded in reining in the activities of
Colombian coca cartels in the 1990s, the cartels changed their roles within the supply chain,
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