convergence

Introduction
bureaucracies remain hierarchical and stove-piped while illicit networks are node-centric,
agile, and opportunistic. The future competitive advantage may lie with the nonstate groups.
Fighting Back
Though national and international responses to the challenges described in this book may
not have yet met the hopes of the more pessimistic contributors, key players are beginning to
recognize the threats that converging illicit networks pose, and they are fighting back. To find
new ways to tackle these threats, we must take a holistic look at what is currently being done
by governments around the world. The U.S. Government and many multinational organizations
are taking decisive steps to attack the networks. The White House’s 2011 Strategy to
Combat Transnational Organized Crime (SCTOC) concludes that “criminal networks are not
only expanding their operations, but they are also diversifying their activities. The result is a
convergence of threats that have evolved to become more complex, volatile, and destabilizing.” 2
The U.S. strategy is an important step toward setting clear priorities for U.S. Government
actions against transnational organized crime. The challenge is in the implementation. Subsequent
strategies and policies created and implemented to combat the threats posed by criminal
networks should be connected to other focal points for the U.S. Government—particularly
cybersecurity, counterterrorism, counterproliferation, building partner capacity, and strengthening
governance. Holistic approaches that recognize transnational organized crime not as a
stove-piped “law enforcement problem,” but as a nefarious feature of the global security environment
that touches the whole world and has an impact on a multitude of vital U.S. interests,
are the types of approaches most likely to succeed over the long term.
Implement an Interagency Response
Currently in the United States there is no long-term strategic planning system to synchronize
all the elements of national power to meet the challenge of converging illicit networks. Furthermore,
in an operational environment, where civilian agencies are the most appropriate lead
with the military in support, there should be a campaign planning mechanism as well. In 2010,
the U.S. Agency for International Development, the third “D” in the U.S. triad of Diplomacy,
Defense, and Development, stood up a policy planning office, but this is only a small step
toward inculcating a culture of planning within the civilian agencies. The State Department
must improve this capability. In support of the SCTOC, the State Department is working to
“build international consensus, multilateral cooperation, and public-private partnerships to
defeat transnational organized crime.” This involves a broad range of bilateral, regional, and
global programs and initiatives that help to strengthen international cooperation with other
committed partners including key allies such as Australia and the United Kingdom. David
Luna describes how such enhanced coordination enables the international community to
dismantle criminal networks and combat the threats they pose not only through law enforcement
efforts, but also by building up governance capacity, supporting committed reformers,
and strengthening the ability of citizens—including journalists—to monitor public functions
and hold leaders accountable for providing safety, effective public services, and efficient use of
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