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How Illicit Networks Impact Sovereignty<br />

address the direct assaults on state functions. More analysis is needed to define the appropriate<br />

structures to negotiate this transition.<br />

This is a battle for information and real power among global networks, social media<br />

groups, and nongovernmental organizations to secure political power. Illicit networks are<br />

controlling turf and capturing state functions, including the legitimate protective security roles<br />

of the state, assuming the power to enforce their will and punish those who do not comply. This<br />

is a battle that favors the agile and those with the will to use brute strength and force (cyber<br />

or otherwise). The criminal netwarriors increasingly employ barbarization and high-order<br />

violence combined with information operations to seize the initiative and embrace the mantle<br />

of social bandit to confer legitimacy on themselves and their enterprises. States must adapt<br />

and react to these changes and challenges to sovereignty in order to maintain collective security<br />

and retain effective control of their territory, borders, and populace.<br />

Notes<br />

1 This chapter draws from my ongoing research into the impact of transnational organized crime on sovereignty.<br />

Specifically, it recaps three prior papers: John P. Sullivan, “Social Networks and Counternetwar Response,”<br />

presented to the Panel on Security, Resilience, and Global Networks at the 51st Annual International Studies<br />

Association Convention in New Orleans, February 20, 2010; “Intelligence, Sovereignty, Criminal Insurgency, and<br />

Drug Cartels,” presented to the Panel on Intelligence Indicators for State Change and Shifting Sovereignty at the<br />

52nd Annual International Studies Association Convention, Montreal, March 18, 2011; and “From Drug Wars to<br />

Criminal Insurgency: Mexican Cartels, Criminal Enclaves, and Criminal Insurgency in Mexico and Central America:<br />

Implications for Global Security,” presented to the Seminar on Netwars and Peacenets, Institute of Global Studies,<br />

Maison des Sciences de l’Homme, Paris, June 27–28, 2011.<br />

2 See Nils Gilman, Jesse Goldhammer, and Steven Weber, eds., Deviant Globalization: Black Market Economy<br />

in the 21st Century (New York: Continuum, 2011). My contribution, chapter 16, “Future Conflict: Criminal Insurgencies,<br />

Gangs and Intelligence,” complements the analysis found in this chapter.<br />

3 See Luis Jorge Garay-Salamanca, Eduardo Salcedo-Albarán, and Isaac De León-Beltrán, Illicit Networks Reconfiguring<br />

States: Social Network Analysis of Colombian and Mexican Cases (Bogota: METODO, 2010).<br />

4 Luis Jorge Garay and Eduardo Salcedo-Albarán, “State Capture and Co-opted State Reconfiguration,” in<br />

“Drug Trafficking, Corruption and State,” prepublication draft, 2011, 29–31.<br />

5 Ibid., 31.<br />

6 Ibid.<br />

7 See David Ronfeldt, Visions from Two Theories, available at , for a comprehensive<br />

view of his network social theory.<br />

8 John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt, eds., Networks and Netwars: The Future of Terror, Crime, and Militancy<br />

(Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2001).<br />

9 See Manuel Castells, The Information Age: Economy, Society, and Culture: The Rise of the Network Society, Vol.<br />

I (Hoboken, NJ: Wiley-Blackwell, 2010); The Power of Identity, Vol. II (Malden, MA: Blackwell, 2004); and The<br />

End of Millennium, Vol. III (Malden, MA: Blackwell, 2008).<br />

10 United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, “The Globalization of Crime: A Transnational Organized Crime<br />

Threat Assessment,” June 2010.<br />

11 Juan Carlos Garzón, Mafia & Co.: The Criminal Networks in Mexico, Brazil, and Colombia (Washington, DC:<br />

Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, Latin American Program, 2008).<br />

12 See John P. Sullivan, “Public-Private Intelligence Models for Responding to the Privatization of Violence,”<br />

paper presented to Intelligence Studies Section of the International Studies Association (ISA), 2007 ISA Annual<br />

Convention, Chicago, February 28–March 3, 2007, as a complement to this chapter. Also see Robert J. Bunker, ed.,<br />

Non-State Threats and Future Wars (London: Frank Cass, 2003), and Robert J. Bunker, ed., Networks, Terrorism and<br />

Global Insurgency (London: Routledge, 2005), for a detailed discussion of the global threat environment.<br />

185

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