Felbab-Brown 39 For details, see Felbab-Brown, “Counternarcotics Policy”; Mansfield, “Sustaining the Decline”; and Christopher Ward and William Byrd, “Afghanistan’s Opium Drug Economy,” Working Paper Series, Report No. SASPR-5 (Washington, DC: The World Bank, December 2004). 40 Author’s interviews with counternarcotics officials in southern Afghanistan and Washington, DC, Spring 2009. 41 Author’s interviews with Dutch PRT members and Uruzgan government officials and NGOs, Uruzgan, Spring 2009. 42 For the difficult choices in balancing a number of objectives and considerations in deciding between “quick-impact” but unsustainable projects or long-term development, see, for example, the complex decisionmaking regarding whether to bring power generators to Kandahar to satisfy the population, complicate the Taliban movements in the city, and reduce crime, even though the generators will be dependent on an outside fuel supply—or wait without electricity while the Kajaki Dam and power lines are completed. The latter approach is sustainable, but insecurity prevents the completion of the project. For details, see Rajiv Chandrasekaran, “U.S. Military, Diplomats at Odds Over How to Resolve Kandahar’s Electricity Woes,” The Washington Post, April 23, 2010; and Blackledge, Lardner, and Reichmann. 43 Author’s interviews with USAID contractors, NGOs, and their Afghan counterparts in Kandahar and Kabul, September 2010. See also Rajiv Chandrasekaran, “‘Still a Long Way to Go’ for U.S. Operation in Marja, Afghanistan,” The Washington Post, June 10, 2010. 44 Author’s interviews with Afghan shopkeepers, September 2010. 45 For a prominent critique of the militia program, which nonetheless does not sufficiently distinguish between the Afghan Local Police and the other militias, see Human Rights Watch, “‘Just Don’t Call It a Militia’: Impunity, Militias, and the ‘Afghan Local Police,’” (New York: Human Rights Watch, September 2011), available at . 46 For details on the various political and security trends as well as negotiations with the Taliban, see Vanda Felbab-Brown, “Afghanistan Ten Years after 9/11: Counterterrorism Accomplishments while a Civil War Is Lurking?” (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, September 6, 2011). 47 Francisco E. Thoumi, Illegal Drugs, Economy, and Society in the Andes (Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, and Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2003). 48 Cannabis production has also spread to areas of poppy cultivation since under current prices its profits can surpass opium poppies and since it is subject to far less law enforcement suppression than the opium poppy economy. For details, see UNODC, Afghanistan Cannabis Survey 2010, June 2010. 49 For details on how such smuggling generates profits, see Felbab-Brown, Shooting Up, 122–124. 50 Frederik Balfour, “Dark Days for a Black Market: Afghanistan and Pakistan Rely Heavily on Smuggling,” Business Week, October 15, 2001, available at . 51 For a discussion of these drug markets and their history of production and trade, see Vanda Felbab-Brown, “The Drug-Conflict Nexus in South Asia: Beyond Taliban Profits and Afghanistan,” in The Afghanistan-Pakistan Theater: Militant Islam, Security, and Stability, ed. Daveed Gartenstein-Ross and Clifford May, 90–112 (Washington, DC: Foundation for Defense of Democracies, May 2010); and Vanda Felbab-Brown, “West African Drug Trade in the Context of Illicit Economies and Poor Governance” (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, October 14, 2010), available at . 52 Amir Zada Asad and Robert Harris, The Politics and Economics of Drug Production on the Pakistan-Afghanistan Border (Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2003); and Nigel J.R. Allan, “Opium Production in Afghanistan and Pakistan,” in Dangerous Harvest: Drug Plants and the Transformation of Indigenous Landscapes, ed. Michael K. Steinberg, Joseph J. Hobbs, and Kent Mathewson, 133–152 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004). 53 Alfred W. McCoy, The Politics of Heroin: CIA Complicity in the Global Drug Trade (New York: Lawrence Hill Books, 2003, rev. ed.), 484–485; and Ikramul Haq, “Pak-Afghan Drug Trade in Historical Perspective,” Asian Survey 36, no. 10 (October 1996), 945–963. 54 Lawrence Lifschultz, “Inside the Kingdom of Heroin,” The Nation, November 14, 1988. 55 Author’s interviews with former civilian and military officials in North-West Frontier Province, Fall 2008 and Spring 2009. 56 Author’s interviews with UNODC, Indian, and Pakistani officials, in New York, Kashmir, India, and Washington, DC (Spring, Summer, and Fall 2008). 208
Lessons for State-Building 57 See, for example, Syed Irfan Ashraf, “Militancy and the Black Economy,” Dawn, March 22, 2009; Sabrina Taversine, “Organized Crime in Pakistan Feeds Taliban,” The New York Times, August 29, 2009; and Pir Zubair Shah and Jane Perlez, “Pakistan Marble Helps Taliban Stay in Business,” The New York Times, July 14, 2008. 58 For more details, see Vanda Felbab-Brown, “Conceptualizing Crime as Competition in State-Making and Designing an Effective Response,” speech at Conference on Illicit Trafficking Activities in the Western Hemisphere, Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies and Office of National Drug Control Policy, available at . 59 For a more extensive discussion of power brokers’ and states’ linkages to an illicit economy, including a postwar illicit economy, see Vanda Felbab-Brown, “Rules and Regulations in Ungoverned Spaces: Illicit Economies, Criminals and Belligerents,” in Ungoverned Spaces: Alternatives to State Authority in an Era of Softened Sovereignty, ed. Harold Trinkunas and Anne Clunnan, 175–192 (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2010). 209
- Page 5 and 6:
Edited by Michael Miklaucic and Jac
- Page 7 and 8:
Contents Foreword vii James G. Stav
- Page 9 and 10:
Foreword Admiral James G. Stavridis
- Page 11 and 12:
Foreword find themselves in. The Re
- Page 13 and 14:
Acknowledgments E very published bo
- Page 15 and 16:
Introduction Michael Miklaucic and
- Page 17 and 18:
Introduction networks will operate
- Page 19 and 20:
Introduction and distribution opera
- Page 21 and 22:
Introduction bureaucracies remain h
- Page 23:
Introduction Just looking at Mexico
- Page 27 and 28:
Chapter 1 Deviant Globalization Nil
- Page 29 and 30:
Deviant Globalization lots of choic
- Page 31 and 32:
Deviant Globalization of (at least
- Page 33 and 34:
Deviant Globalization tale. Today
- Page 35 and 36:
Deviant Globalization What Is to Be
- Page 37:
Deviant Globalization 3 Philip Capu
- Page 40 and 41:
Williams Some commentators wholehea
- Page 42 and 43:
Williams In this connection, not on
- Page 44 and 45:
Williams 20 With a single ship able
- Page 46 and 47:
Williams rates. . . . In 2050, appr
- Page 48 and 49:
Williams of no-go zone and slums an
- Page 50 and 51:
Williams Water would also be at ris
- Page 52 and 53:
Williams is simply the prize of pol
- Page 54 and 55:
Williams era of state budgetary ret
- Page 56 and 57:
Williams The corollary is that alth
- Page 58 and 59:
Williams would not be prudent to re
- Page 60 and 61:
Williams 56 “Global Water Securit
- Page 62 and 63:
Picard information on black markets
- Page 64 and 65:
Picard harms. The economic value of
- Page 66 and 67:
Picard not particularly relevant as
- Page 68 and 69:
Picard The Government Accountabilit
- Page 70 and 71:
Picard The study was based on a var
- Page 72 and 73:
Picard In considering whether the d
- Page 74 and 75:
Picard 50 Table 3. Comparison of Pr
- Page 76 and 77:
Picard Connecting Illicit Market Si
- Page 78 and 79:
Picard have died because they have
- Page 80 and 81:
Picard 56 10 percent = $14.95 billi
- Page 82 and 83:
Picard prohibited, taxed, or regula
- Page 84 and 85:
Picard 32 “The Illegal Shipment o
- Page 87 and 88:
Chapter 4 The Illicit Supply Chain
- Page 89 and 90:
The Illicit Supply Chain business (
- Page 91 and 92:
The Illicit Supply Chain For cash c
- Page 93 and 94:
The Illicit Supply Chain routes (bo
- Page 95 and 96:
The Illicit Supply Chain increase i
- Page 97 and 98:
The Illicit Supply Chain 6 In 2010,
- Page 99 and 100:
Chapter 5 Fixers, Super Fixers, and
- Page 101 and 102:
Fixers, Super Fixers, and Shadow Fa
- Page 103 and 104:
Fixers, Super Fixers, and Shadow Fa
- Page 105 and 106:
Fixers, Super Fixers, and Shadow Fa
- Page 107 and 108:
Fixers, Super Fixers, and Shadow Fa
- Page 109 and 110:
Fixers, Super Fixers, and Shadow Fa
- Page 111 and 112:
Fixers, Super Fixers, and Shadow Fa
- Page 113 and 114:
Fixers, Super Fixers, and Shadow Fa
- Page 115 and 116:
Fixers, Super Fixers, and Shadow Fa
- Page 117 and 118:
Fixers, Super Fixers, and Shadow Fa
- Page 119:
Fixers, Super Fixers, and Shadow Fa
- Page 122 and 123:
Keefe If, as Phil Williams contends
- Page 124 and 125:
Keefe For those seeking to study or
- Page 126 and 127:
Keefe Partial State Degradation Fro
- Page 128 and 129:
Keefe A more recent study hypothesi
- Page 130 and 131:
Keefe An Informal Economy Of course
- Page 132 and 133:
Keefe Notes 1 William Langewiesche,
- Page 135 and 136:
Chapter 7 Threat Finance: A Critica
- Page 137 and 138:
Threat Finance ultimately threatens
- Page 139 and 140:
Threat Finance donations that were
- Page 141 and 142:
Figure 1. A Simple Hawala Transacti
- Page 143 and 144:
Threat Finance benefits offered by
- Page 145 and 146:
Threat Finance Since the start of t
- Page 147 and 148:
Threat Finance played a key role in
- Page 149 and 150:
Threat Finance international standa
- Page 151 and 152:
Threat Finance Directive 5205.14 ch
- Page 153 and 154:
Threat Finance 18 Per 2009 statisti
- Page 155 and 156:
Chapter 8 Money Laundering into Rea
- Page 157 and 158:
Money Laundering into Real Estate p
- Page 159 and 160:
Money Laundering into Real Estate a
- Page 161 and 162:
Money Laundering into Real Estate Y
- Page 163 and 164:
Money Laundering into Real Estate f
- Page 165 and 166:
Money Laundering into Real Estate c
- Page 167 and 168:
Money Laundering into Real Estate S
- Page 169 and 170:
Money Laundering into Real Estate 3
- Page 171:
Part III. The Attack on Sovereignty
- Page 174 and 175:
Miklaucic and Naím linkages to ext
- Page 176 and 177:
Miklaucic and Naím magnitude of il
- Page 178 and 179:
Miklaucic and Naím are groups and
- Page 180 and 181:
Miklaucic and Naím 156 or as defin
- Page 182 and 183: Miklaucic and Naím While disturbin
- Page 184 and 185: Miklaucic and Naím now exceeds US$
- Page 186 and 187: Miklaucic and Naím However, under
- Page 188 and 189: Miklaucic and Naím that would bene
- Page 190 and 191: Miklaucic and Naím An Existential
- Page 192 and 193: Miklaucic and Naím 15 Transparency
- Page 195 and 196: Chapter 10 How Illicit Networks Imp
- Page 197 and 198: How Illicit Networks Impact Soverei
- Page 199 and 200: How Illicit Networks Impact Soverei
- Page 201 and 202: • usurping state fiscal roles (st
- Page 203 and 204: How Illicit Networks Impact Soverei
- Page 205 and 206: How Illicit Networks Impact Soverei
- Page 207 and 208: How Illicit Networks Impact Soverei
- Page 209 and 210: How Illicit Networks Impact Soverei
- Page 211: How Illicit Networks Impact Soverei
- Page 214 and 215: Felbab-Brown the 2010 U.S. military
- Page 216 and 217: Felbab-Brown poorest farmers, who a
- Page 218 and 219: Felbab-Brown the strategic distinct
- Page 220 and 221: Felbab-Brown system. Intolerable to
- Page 222 and 223: Felbab-Brown Poppy cultivation did
- Page 224 and 225: Felbab-Brown Should a civil war be
- Page 226 and 227: Felbab-Brown Moreover, the positive
- Page 228 and 229: Felbab-Brown During conflict situat
- Page 230 and 231: Felbab-Brown 2 Adam Pain, “Opium
- Page 235: Part IV. Fighting Back
- Page 238 and 239: Luna domestic product. The wide ava
- Page 240 and 241: Luna renewed multilateral diplomacy
- Page 242 and 243: Luna organizations or facilitators
- Page 244 and 245: Luna build on regional and interreg
- Page 246 and 247: Luna subregional, and bilateral lev
- Page 248 and 249: Luna 224 • drain the illicit econ
- Page 250 and 251: Luna to combat the assets of the cr
- Page 252 and 253: Luna The following represent exampl
- Page 254 and 255: Luna rests in private hands. Privat
- Page 256 and 257: Luna Author’s Note In honor and m
- Page 258 and 259: Wechsler and Barnabo The drug-traff
- Page 260 and 261: Wechsler and Barnabo threat to nati
- Page 262 and 263: Wechsler and Barnabo the state. Col
- Page 264 and 265: Wechsler and Barnabo enemies in Afg
- Page 266 and 267: Wechsler and Barnabo Notes 1 Statem
- Page 268 and 269: Realuyo 244 • Promote collaborati
- Page 270 and 271: Realuyo a result of globalization,
- Page 272 and 273: Realuyo 248 • reduce the demand f
- Page 274 and 275: Realuyo 250 • Organized crime and
- Page 276 and 277: Realuyo around the world, and their
- Page 278 and 279: Realuyo For more than 10 years, the
- Page 280 and 281: Realuyo power and corruption by the
- Page 282 and 283:
Realuyo handled 141 investigative l
- Page 284 and 285:
Realuyo is in support of those law
- Page 286 and 287:
Realuyo 262 • Know your partners.
- Page 288 and 289:
Realuyo Table 1. Critical Elements
- Page 290 and 291:
Realuyo 18 Ibid. 19 UNODC, “UNODC
- Page 293 and 294:
About the Contributors Michael Mikl
- Page 295 and 296:
About the Contributors Nils Gilman
- Page 297 and 298:
About the Contributors feiting, art
- Page 299:
About the Contributors campaign pla