convergence

Williams
Some commentators wholeheartedly reject such arguments. Indeed, many observers
are sanguine about the current and emerging threat environment. It has been argued, in
particular, that:
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• the threat to states from networked actors, whether terrorists or criminals, has been
greatly exaggerated and networks can be defeated by states that are largely composed
of hierarchical bureaucratic organizations 2
• the “core” of advanced economies is spreading both economic prosperity and stability
to countries in the “gap” and gradually integrating them into a stable political and
economic order 3
• the United States currently is not confronting a clear and present danger but enjoying
“clear and present safety.” 4
Regarding the first of these arguments, it is hard to disagree with the assertion that
networks can be defeated. Of course they can, but only after enormous and asymmetrical
investment of time and resources, not to mention blood and treasure. U.S. military forces in
Iraq, for example, ultimately adapted, and learned and internalized lessons more effectively
than the fragmented insurgency opposing them. 5 Indeed, one of the key lessons was that a
networked insurgency provides opportunities for wedge-driving, something that was done to
good effect in the Anbar Awakening. 6 Yet even in Iraq, it is not clear that the defeat is absolute;
the resilience and capacity for resurgence of both criminal and terrorist networks should not
be ignored. Even when a network is completely dismantled, long-term consolidation of victory
is sometimes confounded by what might be termed network succession, with one set of
networked violent actors replacing another. For example, the Medellín and Cali cartels were
defeated, but what was arguably their Colombian successor, the Revolutionary Armed Forces
of Colombia (FARC) insurgency, as well as their Mexican successors, the Sinaloa Federation
and the Zetas Organization, are if anything even more formidable. Moreover, when networks
are a key component of illicit markets, destroying some of the networked organizations does
not readily translate into anything more than a temporary disruption of the market. In some
cases, such as Mexico, state success in weakening, decapitating, or destroying major drug-trafficking
networks simply creates “vacancy chains” that encourage even greater violence among
those that are left. 7
The second thesis is little more than a modernized variant of Wilsonianism with an
emphasis on the spread of free market economies as a major accompaniment to the powerful
attraction of liberal democracies—both of which are deeply enshrined in the core states. Like
traditional Wilsonianism, it suffers from a high degree of wishful thinking. Unfortunately, it is
not clear that the core is integrating into the gap. In fact, the relationship between the core and
gap seems to be going in the opposite direction from that envisaged by Thomas Barnett, with
the gap enlarging at the expense of the core. Problems are spilling over from disorderly parts
of the world into what are widely considered the zones of peace, stability, and order. What we
are witnessing is not the success of the U.S. civilizing mission, but rather what Lillian Bobea