convergence

Sullivan
notion of border zones to posit a growing “frontier zone,” a zone of difference where identities,
allegiances, and organizational forms exist in a state of constant flux. This state of flux is the
consequence of far-reaching economic trends resulting in a structural “hollowing” of many state
functions while bolstering the state’s executive branch and its emphasis on internal security. 58
This hollowing out of state function is accompanied by an extranational stratification of state
function. According to Sassen, a “much overlooked feature of the current period is the multiplication
of a broad range of partial, often highly specialized, global assemblages of bits of
territory, authority, and rights.” 59 These fractal bits are increasingly contested, with states and
(in the case discussed here) criminal enterprises seeking their own “market” shares.
The potential for a state centralizing power is an insight found in Ronfeldt’s exploration
of the “nexus-state.” Centralized information controls can become a systematic apparatus of
control to dominate or manipulate the populace. Essentially, the state becomes the decentralized
arbiter of network protocols that define the nodal interactions among a complicated
set of networks, actors, and relationships. The state continues to exist, but control over key
functions is transferred to cities, corporations, and issue-specific transnational organizations.
Here is the crux of the battle between states and nonstate criminal netwarriors, between the
light side and dark side networks. Which set of organizational entities will dominate the shift
to new state forms?
Conclusion
State change and shifts in sovereignty are a potential consequence of the erosion of state
authority, legitimacy, and capacity. Outcomes of such shifts could include failed states, the
capture of state authority by transnational criminals, and the emergence of new state forms.
Insurgencies, high-intensity crime, and criminal insurgencies that challenge state legitimacy
and inhibit governance are a key national and global security issue.
“State failure” is one potential outcome of insolvent governance (the inability of weak
states and corrupt state officials to sustain legitimacy and effectively govern) and extreme
instability. This issue has been a concern to the global security and intelligence communities
for several years (specifically since the implosion of the Somali state). According to King and
Zeng, the term “refers to the complete or partial collapse of state authority. . . . Failed states
have governments with little political authority or ability to impose the rule of law. They are
usually associated with widespread crime, violent conflict, or severe humanitarian crises, and
they may threaten the stability of neighboring countries.” 60 While the absolute failure of an
entire state is the extreme outcome, erosion of state capacity, the establishment of criminal
enclaves, and ultimately the overall reconfiguration of power within the state (or “substate
failure”) are likely outcomes.
Nonstate actors such as TCOs, gangs, warlords, private armies, terrorists, and insurgent
networks on the dark side, and private military or security corporations, global corporations,
civil society, nongovernmental organizations, and evolving state, substate, and suprastate institutions
on the light side, demand the development of new security and intelligence structures
to ensure global stability and human security. 61 These structures and mechanisms are needed to
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