convergence

Picard
information on black markets. It provides multiple rankings of black market size by country,
region, product, and market. By summing up various estimates of different illicit activities,
it calculates that the size of the illicit global economy was between $1.69 trillion and $1.92
trillion at the time of measurement. 4 However, in its “Black Market Data Documentation
and Standards,” Havocscope acknowledges that “the very nature of the black market creates
information that is limited and difficult to verify. To be a credible platform, it is essential that
all data presented by Havocscope is properly sourced,” 5 and that “all data listed within Havocscope
is collected from credible public sources, such as newspapers, government reports and
academic journals.” 6 We do not question the fact that Havocscope is collecting and citing its
sources very consistently, but more often than not the cited sources themselves do not explain
how it came up with the data and figures, or how the statistics were produced.
It is well known that measuring illicit markets involves developing statistics on activities
that, by their nature, are intentionally difficult to observe. Unfortunately, the hidden nature
of the phenomenon has led to the propagation of estimates based on poor methodologies,
undisclosed or questionable assumptions, and biased or inaccessible data sets. The lack of
reliability of current estimates, and their use and abuse for influencing policies, have led to
a backlash from scholars, who challenge the dominant school of thought on the frightening
development of criminal networks in a globalized world. With justification, they question the
use of dubious statistics to influence the policy debate and perpetuate wrong perceptions of
the issues. This politicization of numbers has become a topic of academic research in its own
right, as a recent collection of essays demonstrates. 7
For Peter Andreas, a professor of political science at Brown University, “Popular claims
of loss of state control are overly alarmist and misleading and suffer from historical amnesia.” 8
He continues, “At base, much of what makes organized crime transnational involves some form
of profit-driven smuggling across borders. Transnational organized crime is therefore simply
a new term for an old economic practice.” 9 Thomas Naylor, a professor at McGill University
specializing in the history of black markets, criticizes the assumption that “something called
‘globalization’ and the accompanying spread of modern communications and transportation
technology have been a godsend to criminal cartels. . . . The beauty of globalization is that,
much as with organized crime, everyone can agree about its enormous impact because no one
knows what it really is.” 10 Naylor believes that “although it is certainly true that there is more
economic crime across borders today, there is also much more legal business, and absolutely
no proof that the ratio of illegal to legal business is increasing.” 11
These contrarian statements cannot simply be brushed aside. Indeed, there are also
valid arguments that illicit trade may be decreasing. As trade is progressively harmonized,
import tariffs have globally decreased, reducing some of the incentives for smuggling. While
technological innovations may be helping producers of illicit goods and traffickers, they also
make it harder to hide illicit activities, as trails of evidence are not erased easily in the digital
world. Technology also makes it easier, in principle at least, for law enforcement to cooperate,
exchange information, and detect suspicious activities or illicit shipments. Therefore, one can
argue that it is unproven, and indeed very difficult to prove, that illegal markets are increasing,
at least in proportion with global economic activity.
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