convergence

Williams
era of state budgetary retrenchment, these alternative loyalties and the organizational forms
that accompany them will become increasingly important. From the state perspective, this is
a highly negative synergy.
A closely related problem for the state is the rise of subnational and transnational challengers.
In part this reflects the fact that many states have inadequate social control mechanisms
and weak law enforcement and criminal justice systems. Yet there are other considerations
that have also fed in to the rise of transnational criminal organizations. When states are
failing or inadequate in terms of economic management and the provision of social welfare,
the resulting functional holes create pressures and incentives for citizens to engage in criminal
activities. Amid conditions of economic hardship, extralegal means of obtaining basic needs
often become critical to survival. For countries in which there is no social safety net, resort to
the informal economy and to illicit activities is a natural response of many citizens. From this
perspective, the growth of organized crime and drug trafficking, along with the expansion
of prostitution, can be understood as rational responses to dire economic conditions. Such
activities are, in part, coping mechanisms in countries characterized by poverty, poor governance,
and ineffective markets. Organized crime is a highly effective form of entrepreneurship,
providing economic opportunities and multiplier benefits that would otherwise be absent in
economies characterized by inadequate economic management. Illicit means of advancement
offer opportunities that are simply not available in the licit economy. The difficulty, of course,
is that the filling of functional spaces by organized crime exacerbates the weakness of the state.
In contrast, the power of criminal organizations (along with that of clans, warlords, and
ethnic factions) is increased by connections outside the state. According to Shultz and Dew,
“One of the more disturbing trends of non-state armed groups is the extent to which such
groups, including these clan-based groups, are cooperating and collaborating with each other
in networks that span national borders and include fellow tribal groups, criminal groups, and
corrupt political elements.” 71 Even where such collaboration does not occur, many criminal
networks operate in a transnational manner, engaging in jurisdictional arbitrage both to
maximize profits (selling illicit and trafficked commodities where the price is highest) and to
minimize risk, often by operating de facto safe havens. Ironically, when necessary these groups
use national sovereignty for defensive purpose even though their transnational (illicit) business
activities trample all over sovereignty and respect for national borders.
Consequences and Conclusions
The preceding discussion makes it hard to avoid the conclusion that the four sets of drivers
examined and elucidated are providing a “perfect storm” that could have profoundly unsettling
implications for future security and stability. First, it is very akin to the “coming anarchy” that
Robert Kaplan warned about in his seminal article in 1994. 72 Although most intelligence
forecasts for the next several decades and beyond are deliberately nonalarmist and sometimes
even bland in tone, there is an increasing recognition of the scope and severity of the challenges
and the way in which they might interact. The interactions make each of the challenges less
malleable. Wicked challenges become even more wicked when they intersect and overlap. As
John Sullivan pointed out, the urban poor, for example, are likely to be the most significantly
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