convergence

The Criminal State
Criminal Sovereignty
The conceptualizations of state capture above might be characterized as agent-centric. This
level of criminalization goes beyond individual or even a multiplicity of agents; it is the dynamic
of institutionalization. This is to say that the very institutions of the state are subject to subversion
and perverse evolution, becoming in the process criminal enterprises. Thompson explains:
[L]ike all forms of corruption, the institutional kind involves the improper use of public
office for private purposes. But unlike individual corruption, it encompasses conduct that
under certain conditions is a necessary or even desirable part of institutional duties. . . .
What makes the conduct improper is institutional in the sense that it violates principles
that promote the distinctive purposes of the institution. It is still individuals who are
the agents of institutional corruption and individuals who should be held accountable
for it, but their actions implicate the institution in a way that the actions of the agents
of individual corruption do not. 41
In her robust description of state capture, Grzymala-Busse builds her definition around
four strategies; clientelism, predation, redistribution without democratic competition, and
capture of state assets under competitive conditions:
All these strategies involve the formation of distinct state institutions and capacities.
State seizure does not simply corrode the state. Although extractive rulers seek to
maximize their discretion by weakening regulation and oversight, they also construct
rules and durable practices of redistribution, budgeting, and authority. It is not simply
the case that “clientelism thrives when government institutions are weak” (Manzetti
& Wilson, 2007, p. 955), but rather, that specific institutions are built to serve the
extractive goals of rulers, sometimes with unintended consequences (Tilly, 1992). 42
This builds on Hellman, Kaufmann, Kupferschmidt, and Thompson by further clarifying
the malignant evolution of the state institutions themselves within the process of advanced
criminalization and previews a sound characterization of the criminal state. In the criminal
state, individuals are no longer able to function effectively without bending to or even supporting
the new, illicit organizational mission. Indeed, to resist complicity in the criminal mission
generally entails significant personal risk and cost or even loss of life.
Charles Taylor’s Liberia
Convicted war criminal Charles Taylor was president of Liberia from 1997 to 2003 and controlled
most of the territory of the small West African state from the early 1990s on. During
that period, he effectively turned the apparatus of the state into a criminal enterprise for the
private enrichment of himself and his cronies through extraction of national resources. He also
exploited political instability in neighboring countries to extend his reach into their resource
bases. Farah writes, “What set Taylor apart was his ability to connect the state apparatus with
different criminal and terrorist groups in order to form a single enterprise—an enterprise
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