convergence

Miklaucic and Naím
magnitude of illicit commerce today are unprecedented. Estimates of the global black market
range from 2 to 25 percent of global product. The mobility of illicit commodities shipped in
vast quantities via standardized shipping container units, and thus hidden, across the world is
unprecedented. And the interconnections between illicit networks defying historical geographical,
cultural, and motivational barriers are unprecedented. Ultimately, the clear and present
danger constituted by these threats is something quite new under the sun.
A second debilitating delusion is that illicit networks and their activities are all about
crime and criminals. We argue it is no longer merely about crime; it is beyond crime. Today it
is about criminalized states and the future configuration of power within the state system. If
you approach this challenge as merely a problem of crime and criminals, the traditional way
of dealing with it requires the typical institutions: law enforcement, courts, and jails. Today’s
challenge is about incentives and reinforcing the value of service in the public interest and the
integrity of public administration. These and other normative values must be incubated and
fortified in schools, churches, community organizations, and in the media through the disciplined
application of incentives and disincentives. The delusion that you can deal with these
issues only through traditional ways of crime fighting is very dangerous.
The third delusion is that illicit behavior is an aberration and the people involved in this
business are deviants. The notion of essential deviant character has its origins in the work of
Cesare Lombroso’s theory of “anthropological criminology.” 2 Essentially, the argument is that
you are a criminal if you are deviant. In many countries, normalcy is defined by involvement in
what we are here calling illicit networks and illicit commerce. Approximately 8 to 10 percent
of China’s gross domestic product (GDP) is associated with the manufacture and export of
counterfeit goods. This endeavor involves a lot of people, a lot of families, and a lot of economic
activities related to something we call crime. For them, it is their daily life. Sixty percent of Afghanistan’s
GDP is associated with poppy production, cultivation, and distribution. How many
workers does this require? China and Afghanistan are two prominent country examples, but, in
fact, every day millions of people all over the world wake up, go to work, work all day, and bring
bread to their families, all thanks to doing something we label a criminal activity. Moreover, the
counterfeit commodities and contraband they produce are consumed by ordinary individuals
throughout the world, sometimes unknowingly, but very often in full knowledge of their illicit
origin—for instance, when a packet of counterfeit cigarettes is purchased or a counterfeit car
part is installed. Are all of these consumers deviants as well? Are the multitudes of gardeners,
farm and restaurant workers, and nannies working illegally all deviants?
Ambiguity pervades this field. Three specific ambiguities that make analysis particularly
difficult are the blurring between legal and illegal politics, between the legal and illegal private
sector, and between legal and illegal philanthropy. The transnational criminal organizations
that animate global illicit networks are businesses. For any highly regulated big business, it is
absolutely normal to dedicate part of its revenues to influencing the regulators. The financial,
pharmaceutical, defense, and food industries—indeed, all industry groups—engage in such
activity. Public institutions including universities, hospitals, and media organizations do the
same. In some countries, this is called corruption; in others, it is called lobbying. In the United
States, the practice of using some of your business revenue to influence the very government
officials who make decisions affecting your bottom line is pervasive. If a company that we
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