convergence

Introduction
and distribution operations migrated to Mexico. The “balloon effect” is not new. What has
changed is the skill of trafficking organizations in applying aspects of a commercial supply
chain to support their illicit activities and get their products to the customer, and their payment—predominantly
cash—back to the merchant.
Criminal and terrorist entities are mobile and increasingly migratory actors capable
of shifting both their locations and their vocations in order to exploit geographic, political,
enforcement, and regulatory vulnerabilities. They do not view state borders as impenetrable
“castle walls.” This process has led a range of bad actors to shift their operations to certain
regions, countries, or cities that will allow them to function in a relatively unimpeded manner.
All illicit networks need is one lax jurisdiction to create a center of operations. Certain specific
locations such as Dubai, Turkey, Moldova, and the Tri-Border Area of South America have
proven so appealing to various criminal or terrorist enterprises that they have emerged as
“hubs” in the illicit global economy. Global crime networks collocate with members of radical
political movements in ungoverned border regions in Central and South America; similar
collocation has occurred in the Balkans.
Patrick Radden Keefe argues that terrorist and criminal groups have different needs for
their operations centers. Organized crime is dependent on a baseline of infrastructure and
services, while terrorist organizations can operate in unstable, chaotic environments or even
where there is complete state failure. Many hubs in the illicit economy are found in major cities
that have the advantages found in strong states—infrastructure, banking, and a baseline level of
rule of law. Other key qualities of hubs include state degradation, borderlands where sovereign
boundaries converge, corruption, poverty with large informal economies, and extensive tribal
or kinship networks.
One of the least understood nodes in the illicit network is a new type of nonstate political
actor, a “global guerrilla” or “super fixer.” 1 Douglas Farah describes a small group of super fixers
and enablers who allow the networks to function and facilitate global connectivity among
illicit networks including linking criminal and terrorist groups. Not loyal to any single entity
or network, they are valuable to multiple, even competing, networks. Among the fascinating
attributes of these individuals is their ability to survive regime changes and political upheavals
that on the surface would seem to presage their doom. For them there is no ideological hurdle
to overcome, only business to be done. These individuals owe little allegiance to anyone or
any cause but themselves. As quasi-independent operators, super fixers are the key links in
the chains that move illicit commodities—cocaine, blood diamonds, “conflict” timber, human
beings—because they have the relationships to reach out and connect to the next concentric
circle of actors. These operators are vital links—both for rebels in the jungle or for Afghan
warlords who have no understanding of the outside world—to the market for their illicit
commodities. In the process they can gain immense wealth and influence. The geopolitical
importance of super fixers is only likely to increase in the coming decade.
The ultimate enabler of both crime and terrorism is money. Any book on transnational
organized crime must address the importance of money and of following the money. Both
criminal and terrorist groups must raise, move, and hide or integrate their money. Louise
Shelley explains how investment in real estate is used as a way both of laundering illicit
proceeds and of generating new revenue through traditional real estate–related transactions,
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