convergence

Miklaucic and Naím
However, under the current regime of Hugo Chávez, the answer appears to be no. Farah
argues that a criminal state is one
162
where the senior leadership is aware of and involved—either actively or through passive
acquiescence—on behalf of the state in transitional criminal enterprises, where
TOC [transnational organized crime] is used as an instrument of statecraft, and
where levels of state power are incorporated into the operational structure of one or
more TOC groups. 36
Arguably, this definition fuses two distinct phenomena; the participation either passive
or active of senior officials in criminal activity, and the convergence of state and criminal organizations
as crime is used as a tool of statecraft and state organs become functional parts of
criminal operations. Venezuela clearly meets Farah’s first criterion: senior officials are involved
both actively and passively in a wide range of criminal activities. At this point in time it is no
longer clear to what degree President Chávez remains in control. He undoubtedly continues
steadfast in pursuit of his Bolivarian project, which though we may find it repulsive and
misguided is not inherently criminal. However, Venezuela may have passed the point where
Chávez’s will is sufficient to clean up the country, or at least effectively counter the criminal
activity within its borders.
Guinea-Bissau
Guinea-Bissau, on the other hand, may have crossed over the threshold. This small West
African state is deeply mired in narcotics trafficking, serving as a major transit point between
source regions in Latin America and demand centers in Europe and the United States. It is
among the least developed countries in the world, ranking 176 th out of 187 countries in the
“2011 Human Development Index” published by the UN Development Programme. 37 Under
the Drug Kingpin Act, Washington has imposed financial sanctions on several members of the
ruling elite, including air force head Ibraima Papa Camara and former navy chief Jose Americo
Bubo Na Tchuto. 38 Guinea-Bissau ranks 154 th out of 172 in the Transparency International
“Corruption Perceptions Index” for 2011. 39 Though not ranked in the Gilley state legitimacy
index, the succession of military coups in recent years and the absence of state capacity in
virtually all sectors should cast doubt on any pretense to legitimacy. If we accept the above, we
can comfortably place Guinea-Bissau in the ranks of criminally infested states.
Does Guinea-Bissau have the ability to fight back? The evidence suggests not. Symptomatic
is a 2006 case in which two Latin Americans were detained while in possession of 670 kg
of cocaine. The army secured their release and the disposition of the cocaine went unknown.
In 2007 Guinea-Bissau police were able to seize 635 kg of cocaine, but “traffickers escaped with
the remainder of the consignment believed to total around 2.5 mega ton of cocaine [which had
been flown into a military airstrip] because police did not have the manpower or vehicles to
give chase.” 40 Government spokespersons routinely dismiss allegations of official involvement
while acknowledging the state is woefully unequipped to meet the challenge.