convergence
convergence
convergence
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Sullivan<br />
state capacity gap), corrupting and co-opting state organs (government, the police, the judiciary)<br />
in all or part of the state through the development of criminal enclaves, or, at the extreme<br />
edge, state failure. State reconfiguration appears to be a more common outcome than abject<br />
state capture or state failure. 3 While failure and reconfiguration may appear to be the same<br />
phenomenon, they have distinct features. State capture (StC) involves criminals subverting<br />
and seizing control of key political functions at the central or national level (politicians, judges,<br />
police, etc.) through corruption. Co-opted state reconfiguration (CStR) involves the systematic<br />
alteration of governance to benefit the criminal enterprise. 4<br />
Co-opted state reconfiguration is a distinct, advanced form of state capture. CStR involves<br />
the participation of lawful and unlawful groups seeking economic, criminal, judicial,<br />
and political benefits together with a quest for social legitimacy. Coercion, political alliances<br />
(complementing or replacing bribery), and impacts on all branches and levels of government are<br />
core features of this dynamic. As Garay and Salcedo-Albarán argue, “The ‘co-opted reconfiguration’<br />
concept accepts that co-optation can be carried out in any direction. In a CStR situation,<br />
it is therefore possible to find scenarios in which legal agents—candidates or officials—are<br />
co-opting illegal agents— paramilitary or subversive groups—and vice versa.” 5 In a CStR<br />
process, state institutions are manipulated and even reconfigured from inside. When officials<br />
are being captured and manipulated from outside, it is reproduced as an StC situation. 6 TCOs<br />
as deviant social networks exploit both dynamics.<br />
Deviant Social Networks and Deviant Globalization<br />
Social networks are important elements of contemporary social and political processes.<br />
Certainly this is not new; social networks have been around since man began assembling in<br />
political groups at all levels of society. Yet the information age is bringing important changes to<br />
the nature of networks. Members of networks can communicate across vast distances in real<br />
time, changing the pace and shape of their individual and collective influence. The importance<br />
of information age networks is a key to understanding emerging conflict.<br />
David Ronfeldt has argued that societies have moved through four distinct (albeit<br />
overlapping) phases of organization: tribes, institutions, markets, and networks. 7 Ronfeldt<br />
and Arquilla discussed the conflict and security dimensions of networks and netwar in<br />
their landmark collection Networks and Netwars. 8 Netwar is essentially an emergent form of<br />
low-intensity conflict, crime, and activism waged by social networked actors, including TCOs,<br />
terrorists, and gangsters. Manuel Castells has also outlined the rise of the networked, information<br />
society in his landmark trilogy The Information Age: Economy, Society, and Culture. 9<br />
Specifically, Castells envisioned the emergence of powerful global criminal networks as one<br />
facet of the shift to a new state/sovereignty structure where the state no longer controlled all<br />
aspects of the economy and society. Networks currently take two shapes: positive networks<br />
that inform civil society and dark side or negative networks that exploit society. These dark<br />
side actors are essentially “criminal netwarriors.”<br />
Transnational gangs and cartels operating as netwarriors are a threat to the sovereignty<br />
of nations. “When states fail to deliver public services and security, criminals fill the vacuum.” 10<br />
This situation leads to a “time of anomalies and transitions,” according to Juan Carlos Garzón.<br />
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